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Abstract
Host-parasite co-evolution can have profound impacts on a wide range of ecological and evolutionary pro-
cesses, including population dynamics, the maintenance of genetic diversity, and the evolution of recombi-
nation. To examine the co-evolution of quantitative traits in hosts and parasites, we present and study a
co-evolutionary model of a social parasite-host system that incorporates (1) ecological dynamics that feed
back into their co-evolutionary outcomes; (2) variation in whether the parasite is obligate or facultative; and
(3) Holling Type II functional responses between host and parasite, which are particularly suitable for social
parasites that face time costs for host location and its social manipulation. We perform local and global
analyses for the co-evolutionary model and the corresponding ecological model. In the absence of evolution,
our ecological model analyses imply that an extremely small value of the death rate for facultative social
parasites, primarily due to hunting/searching for potential host species, can drive a host extinct globally
under certain conditions, while an extremely large value of the death rate can drive the parasite extinct
globally. The facultative parasite system can have one, two, or three interior equilibria, while the obligate
parasite system can have either one or three interior equilibria. Multiple interior equilibria result in rich
dynamics with multiple attractors. The ecological system, in particular, can exhibit bi-stability between
the facultative-parasite-only equilibrium and the interior coexistence equilibrium when it has two interior
equilibria. Our analysis on the co-evolutionary model provides important insights on how co-evolution can
change the ecological and evolutionary outcomes of host-parasite interactions. Our findings suggest that:
(a) The host and parasite can select different strategies that may result in local extinction of one species.
These strategies can have convergence stability (CS), but may not be evolutionary stable strategies (ESS);
(b) The host and its facultative (or obligate) parasite can have ESS that drive the host (or the obligate
parasite) extinct locally; (c) Trait functions play an important role in the CS of both boundary and interior
equilibria, as well as their ESS; and (d) A small variance in the trait difference that measures parasitism
efficiency can destabilize the co-evolutionary system, and generate evolutionary arms-race dynamics with
different host-parasite fluctuating patterns.
Keywords: Bistability, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, Holling Type II
Functional Response, Facultative/obligate Parasite.
1. Introduction
Parasitism takes many forms in nature, but can be broadly defined as a symbiosis in which one member
(the parasite) benefits from the use of resources gathered by the other member (the host). In most cases, the
parasite lives on and/or feeds directly from the host. In social parasitism, however, the parasite manipulates
its host behaviorally rather than physiologically, and derives benefit from work provided by the host (Cini
et al 2015). The different forms of social parasitism exemplify the diversity of ways in which social parasites
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can cheat by manipulating the efforts of their hosts. In brood parasitism, a parent deceives or dominates
other individuals into rearing their young (Field 1992; Brandt et al 2005; Spottiswoode et al 2012). For
avian brood parasites, this generally occurs via deception, when females lay eggs on other birds’s nests and
the host parents respond as if the parasitic chick is one of their own (reviewed by Kruger 2007; Davies 2011).
This deception is often continued by the parasitic chick, which acts as one of the host brood but may claim
a disproportionate proportion of the food resources provisioned by the host parent (Kilner et al 2004), or
even remove the hosts own chicks from the nest (Spottiswoode et al 2012).
In another taxonomic realm, insect social parasites, or inquilines, gain acceptance into a social insect
colony by mimicking the pheromonal signals of queens or workers; They then live within that colony, ex-
ploiting its resources for their own reproduction (Bourke and Franks 1991; Buschinger 2009). Colony para-
sitism can also occur via more direct aggression, as when queens of some wasp species directly displace other
queens and usurp the colony as their own (Field 1992; Shorter and Tibbets 2009). In brood raiding ants,
colonies invade nearby nests and retrieve brood, usually in pupal form just before they morph into new adult
workers. The emerging workers behave as offspring of the invading colony, performing the same functions
as if they were in their natal nest (Brandt et al 2005; Holldobler and Wilson 1990 &2009). In some of the
most extreme examples of brood raiding, ant species (slave-making ants) become dependent on the raided
workers, without which they cannot functionally maintain their own colonies. Their raiding efficiency and
intensity has co-evolutionary consequences for both the host and raiding species (Foitzik et al 2001).
Although diverse in their specifics, each of these cases takes a temporal progression in which the parasite
must locate a host and then manipulate it into social acceptance of either the parasite or its offspring; it does
so either by deception or aggression. It then establishes an ongoing relationship in which the host provides
care, usually to the parasite’s offspring, by providing resources, defending the parasitic offspring, and/or
providing other parental care. These stages provide a scaffold around which we can model the interplay of
ecological and evolutionary effects on parasites and their host. The dynamics within the social parasite-host
system can also provide a framework to capture the dynamics inherent in parasite-host relationships more
generally.
Interspecific social parasitism, in which one species parasitizes another, is rarer than intraspecific social
parasitism, but can have profound effects on community dynamics. Its impact on the relationship between
host and parasite is highly dependent on host number (Sorenson 1997; Brandt et al 2005). When modeling
the dyadic relationship between a parasitic species and a given host, we must consider whether that parasite
is fully dependent on that specific host, i.e. obligate, or whether it can utilize other host species as well. A
parasite with multiple potential hosts (generalist parasites), essentially behaves as if it is facultative within
the context of that dyadic relationship. For the purposes of this model, we focus on interspecific parasitism,
and facultative and generalist parasites are considered as equivalent.
The ecological and evolutionary dynamics for facultative versus obligate social parasites are very differ-
ent. A generalist parasite, such as the brown headed cowbird may parasitize tens to hundreds of species, and
must flexibly deal with the associated variation in parental care and diets across those species (Rothstein
1975). In contrast, the common cuckoo specializes on a few species, focusing primarily on the reed warbler.
The reed warbler has evolved defensive strategies including recognition of cuckoos and their eggs (Davies
and Brook 1988; Stoddard and Stevens 2011). In return, the cuckoo uses a variety of mimicking strategies,
from chick calls to egg color and markings to overcome the reed warbler’s defenses (Davies and Brook 1988;
Kilner et al 1991; Davies 2011; Stoddard and Stevens 2011). The ecological and evolutionary drivers of
obligate versus facultative parasitism are complex. Phylogenetic analyses suggest the number of hosts for
cowbirds has increasingly expanded evolutionarily (Rothstein et al 2002); however, this parasite is also in-
creasing in range and number. In contrast, the cuckoo host-parasite relationship suggests no clear pattern
of expansion over evolutionary time, and variation in host number may be better explained by ecological
conditions (Rothstein et al 2002).
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Obligate social parasitism generates a potentially tight dynamical fitness relationship between parasite
and host. As the host suffers fitness costs from the parasite, to avoid extinction it must evolve defensive
strategies to counter the parasite (Bogusch et al 2006). In turn, the parasite, dependent on the resources
acquired from its host, is selected to overcome the host’s defensive strategies (Poulin et al. 2000). As a result,
the continuous interactions between the parasite and its host lead to co-evolutionary dynamics, as illustrated
by the evolutionary arms-race paradigm that has been used for many host-parasite systems (Anderson and
May 1982; Thompson and Burdon 1992; Foitzik et al 2003). Close co-evolutionary interactions in a stepwise
fashion are especially likely to occur when host and parasite exhibit similar generation times and population
sizes; this is generally the case for social parasites, because brood parasitism requires a match with host
offspring developmental timing (Foitzik et al 2003). In such situations, hosts are expected to more closely
match the parasite in strategy evolution, and thus to evolve increased resistance strategies when parasite
pressure is strong (Foitzik et al 2001& 2003). In support, recent studies on co-evolution in both avian and
insect social parasites found indications of arms races and resistance strategies in highly parasitized host
populations (Foitzik et al. 2001; Kilner and Langmore 2011).
The evolutionary dynamics of host-parasite interactions can be influenced by multiple intersecting pa-
rameters. These may include: the efficiency of parasitism on a specific host; the genetic structure of host and
parasite populations; migration rates of parasite and host, and; the degree of mutual specialization (Brandt
et al 2005). The dynamics among these variables can be complex, and their intensity may vary considerably
between systems for which the parasite is obligatorily bound to a single host, versus those for which the
parasite is facultative on a given host and/or can exploit multiple hosts. In this paper, we develop a simple
co-evolutionary model by using evolutionary game theory (EGT), to investigate the ways in which these
co-evolutionary dynamics can change the ecological and evolutionary outcomes of host-parasite symbioses.
Surprisingly, the mathematical models that examine the co-evolution of quantitative traits in hosts and
parasites are relatively few in number (Hocherg and van Baalen 1998; van Baalen 1998; Gandon et al. 2002;
Koella and Boe¨te 2003; Restif and Koella 2003; Bonds 2006; Zu et al 2007; Best et al 2009). However,
they provide an important theoretical framework within which to consider the importance of co-evolutionary
dynamics to the evolution of hosts and parasites. Hochberg and van Baalen (1998) used simulations to
study host-parasite co-evolution in relation to spatial heterogeneities. Restif and Koella (2003) showed that
when host defense occurs specifically through avoidance, the host-parasite relationship can move towards a
single co-evolutionary stable state (CoESS), which cannot be invaded by other strategies. Van Baalen (1998)
showed that resistance through recovery, rather than avoidance, can generate bistability such that resistance
and virulence are either both low or both high.
A limitation of the above models is that they examined only the evolutionary stability (ES) of the
outcomes, i.e. their ability to be invaded once reached. Eshel (1983) and Christiansen (1991) examined con-
vergence stability (CS), the other important component of the evolutionary process, determining whether
populations will move away from a CoESS over evolutionary time and whether evolutionary branching will
occur. Dieckmann and Law (1996), and Marrow et al. (1996) provided a general understanding of the impact
of co-evolution on both ES and CS. In another approach, the work of Kisdi (2006) studied the impact of
trade- offs on co-evolutionary dynamics through a general model of predator-prey co-evolution. Zu et al
(2007) expanded this to examine evolutionary dynamics of the host (as prey) and the parasite (as predator)
with a Holling Type II function. Their results showed that branching in the host can induce secondary
branching in the parasite, and that these evolutionary dynamics can produce a stable limit cycle. The work
of Best et al. (2009) also emphasized the importance of considering co-evolutionary dynamics and showed
that certain highly virulent parasites may result from responses to host evolution.
These models collectively assume that the parasite (or predator) is obligate. However, facultative and/or
generalist social parasites are actually the norm. Further, many models assume a slow evolutionary timescale
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to allow application of a timescale separation argument and reduce dimensions and simplify mathematical
analysis (Feng et al 2004). However, in social parasitism the changes in allele frequencies (and associated
phenotypes) likely occur at the same rate as changes in population densities or spatial distributions, which
can alter the ecological processes driving changes in population densities or distribution (Gingerich 2009;
Cortez and Weitz 2014). Motivated by these issues, we present a fully co-evolutionary model of a social
host-parasite system that includes consideration of: (1) the ecological dynamics that feed back into the
co-evolutionary outcome; and (2) variation in the form of social parasitism from obligate to facultative. The
interaction between host and parasite is modeled by using Holling Type II functional responses. These are
particularly suitable for brood parasitism, because they allow consideration of the need for parasites to search
for and locate hosts, as well as time interacting with hosts. Our model allow us to explore the following
questions:
1. How do ecological dynamics change when a parasite transitions between being facultative and obligate?
2. Can the parasite or host have evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that can drive each other extinct at
local or global scales?
3. Can co-evolution rescue a host-parasite symbiosis from extinction?
4. What are the effects of trait functions on the ecological and evolutionary dynamics between the parasite
and host?
The remaining sections of this article are organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the background
of the EGT modeling approach, define CS and ESS mathematically, and derive our co-evolutionary host-
parasite model to incorporate a parasite can be either obligate or facultative. In Section 3, we perform and
compare local and global analyses of the ecological dynamics of the co-evolutionary model in the absence
of evolution. Our results show that the ecological model of parasite being facultative can generate one, two
or three interior equilibria with the possibility that the host goes to extinction either locally or globally.
However, the obligate parasite model can have either one or three interior equilibria with the possibility
that the obligate parasite goes extinct. In Section 4, we study the dynamics and related ESS of the fully
co-evolutionary model of the host-parasite system, including ecological dynamics that feed back into the co-
evolutionary outcomes. In particular, when trait functions follow normal distributions, we derive sufficient
conditions that the host-only equilibrium and the parasite-only equilibrium can have ESS, and study the
boundary and interior dynamics. The work of the latter case shows that: (a) the co-evolutionary model
can have multiple interior equilibria where each equilibrium potentially has two ESS; (b) evolution can save
the host from extinction; and (c) a small variance in parasitism efficiency can destabilize the system, thus
generating evolutionary arms-race dynamics with different host-parasite fluctuating patterns. In Section 5,
we conclude our study by providing a summary of our results and their potential biological implications.
The last section gives the detailed proofs of our analytical results.
2. Evolutionary game theory models: co-evolutionary host-parasite models
In an EGT model, the co-evolution of hosts and their parasites can be considered as a mathematical
game, where the host and parasite are players, with corresponding strategies, strategy sets, and pay-offs
(Vincent and Brown 2005). The strategies represent phenotypic traits with heritable components, and the
strategy set is the collection of all evolutionarily feasible strategies for a particular individual, with corre-
sponding fitness pay-offs. Here we use EGT to investigate host-parasite co-evolution within a population
dynamical framework, under the assumptions that the interaction between a host and parasite is modeled
by a Holling Type II functional response, and that the reliance of the parasite on the identified host can
range from completely obligate (the parasite is completely dependent on that host for any fitness pay-off)
to facultative (the parasite can survive without parasitism and/or can parasitize other available hosts).
4
2.1. The modeling framework
We follow the modeling methodology for EGT presented in Vincent and Brown (2005), (also see references
Abrams et al 1993a, 1993b; Rael et al 2011; Cushing and Hudson 2012; Kang and Udiani 2014; Kang et al
2015). The methodology derives equations that describe the population dynamics of n interacting species
xi together with the dynamics of (mean) phenotypic traits ui (or strategies) which serve to characterize
all individuals of a particular species and are assumed to have a heritable component. Let x = [x1, x2]
denote the vector of population densities of host, parasite and u = [u1, u2] denote the vector of all strategies
u = [u1, u2] ∈ [U1,U2] = U used by the species i, which are distinct and drawn from the same set Ui of
evolutionarily feasible traits. The host-parasite co-evolution dynamic models in terms of differential equations
have the following form:
dxi
dt = xiGi(vi, u, x)|vi=ui = xiHi(u, x)
dui
dt = σ
2
i
∂Gi(vi,u,x)
∂vi
∣∣
vi=ui
,
(1)
where Gi(vi, u, x) is the fitness of a focal individual that chooses (or inherits) trait vi when the population
has mean trait u and density x; Hi(u, x) is considered as the fitness function for species xi; and σ
2
i is the
variance in traits (strategies) present in species xi about the mean trait ui which therefore a measure of the
“evolutionary speed”. The host-parasite population dynamics and its associated trait dynamics (1) together
constitute a dynamical system for the 4-vector
[x, u] = [x1, x2, u1, u2] ∈ R2+ × U1 × U2
whose dynamic describes an evolutionary process known as Darwinian dynamics (Vincent and Brown 2005).
These equations (1) allow us to investigate the role of evolution plays in determining, for example, the dy-
namical outcomes of host-parasite interactions.
Darwinian dynamics will often possess a (locally asymptotically) stable equilibrium [x∗, u∗]. Suppose
this equilibrium remains stable when additional species (with their associated traits) are added to the com-
munity. This means that the coalition of traits ui associated with those species present in the equilibrium
(i.e. for which x∗ > 0) is able to resist invasion by other species with their other traits. For example, the
4-dimensional equilibrium [x∗, u∗] of (1), when embedded in the higher 2m-dimensional space of the larger
community (m > 2), remains (locally asymptotically) stable. In this case, we say that this coalition of traits
u∗ is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The ESS maximum principle provides a necessary condition for
a coalition of traits in an equilibrium [x∗, u∗] to be an ESS (Vincent and Brown 2005). According to this
principle, if a coalition of strategies is an ESS, then the G-function evaluated at equilibrium conditions, i.e.
G(v, u∗, x∗), takes on an isolated global maximum with respect to v at each trait vi = u
∗
i in the coalition.
Furthermore,this maximum value must equal 0 for the differential equation model.
We say an equilibrium x∗ is an Ecologically Stable Equilibrium (ESE) if x∗ is locally asymptotically stable
for the ecological dynamics dxidt = xiGi(vi, u, x)|vi=ui = xiHi(u, x) for given values of traits ui. We say an
equilibrium (x∗, u∗) has Convergency Stability if it is locally asymptotically stable in the co-evolutionary
model (1). We say an equilibrium (x∗, u∗) has u∗ as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) of the co-
evolutionary model (1) if (x∗, u∗) has CS, and it satisfies the following ESS maximum principle:
max
vi∈Ui
{Gi(vi, u∗, x∗)} = Gi(u∗i , u∗, x∗) = 0 for both i = 1, 2 when x∗i > 0, i = 1, 2 or (2)
max
vi∈Ui
{Gi(vi, u∗, x∗)} = Gi(u∗i , u∗, x∗) ≤ 0 for both i = 1, 2 when x∗1x∗2 = 0 (3)
where u∗ = (u∗1, u
∗
2), x
∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) and Ui is the feasible set of trait values vi which can be a bounded set or R.
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2.2. Derivation of a host-parasite co-evolutionary model
We consider a host-parasite co-evolutionary model with Holling Type II functional responses where the
parasite can be facultative or obligate. Let Gi(vi, u, x) be the fitness of a focal individual that inherits trait
vi when the population has mean trait u and density x. We can take Gi in (1) with the following forms:
G1(v1, u2, x) = r1(1− x1K1(v1) )−
a(v1,u2)x2
1+h a(v1,u2)x1
G2(v2, u1, x) =
e a(u1,v2)x1
1+ha(u1,v2)x1
− d(v2) + r2(1− x2K2(v2) )
(4)
where a(v1, v2) denotes the parasitism efficiency of a parasite with phenotypic trait v2 on host individuals
with phenotypic trait v1 with the assumption that the stronger host-parasite interactions are, the more
similar host and parasite traits are; Ki(vi) is the carrying capacity of species i individuals with phenotypic
trait vi; and d(v2) ≥ 0 is the death rate of parasitic individuals with phenotypic trait v2 due to their hunt-
ing or attacking all potential hosts. For simplicity, we assume that other parameters (i.e., the host intrinsic
growth rate r1 > 0, the parasite intrinsic growth rate r2 ≥ 0 in the absence of parasitism towards host species
x1, the parasite handling time h, and the conversion efficiency e) are not influenced by the quantitative traits.
As a consequence, the co-evolutionary dynamics of monomorphic resident host and parasite populations
with traits u1 and u2 is given by the following set of nonlinear equations:
dx1
dt = x1G1(v1, u, x)|v1=u1 = x1H1(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x1
[
r1
(
1− x1K1(u1)
)
− a(u1,u2)x21+ha(u1,u2)x1
]
dx2
dt = x2G2(v2, u, x)|v2=u2 = x2H2(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x2
[
ea(u1,u2)x1
1+ha(u1,u2)x1
− d+ r2
(
1− x2K2(u2)
)]
du1
dt = σ
2
1
∂G1(v1,u,x)
∂v1
∣∣
v1=u1
= σ21
∂H1(u1,u2,x1,x2)
∂u1
= σ21
[
r1x1K
′
1(u1)
K1(u1)2
− x2
∂a(u1,u2)
∂u1
(1+ha(u1,u2)x1)2
]
du2
dt = σ
2
2
∂G2(v2,u,x)
∂v2
∣∣
v2=u2
= σ22
∂H2(u1,u2,x1,x2)
∂u2
= σ22
[
ex1
∂a(u1,u2)
∂u2
(1+ha(u1,u2)x1)2
− d′(u2) + r2x2K
′
2(u2)
K2(u2)2
]
(5)
where trait functions Ki(ui), i = 1, 2 and a(u1, u2) are positive, bounded and smooth functions in U1 × U2.
The co-evolutionary model (5) incorporates the following ecological assumptions:
1. In the absence of other species, the population of each species follows a logistic growth function. When
a host species x1 is absent, the population dynamics of the parasite x2 depends on the death rate d
caused by that parasite on all potential host species, coupled with the parasite’s intrinsic growth rate
r2 > 0, in the absence of parasitism on host species x1. For a chosen trait value u2 of parasite x2,
if d(u2) > r2, then the parasite population with trait u2 will go extinct in the absence of host x1.
In such a case, we consider parasite x2 to be obligate. If d(u2) < r2, then the parasite population
with trait u2 can persist in the absence of host x1, and for purposes of this model is called facultative.
Thus, in the case of obligate parasitism, the parasite species is unable to persist in the absence of the
host. Under the case of facultative parasitism, the parasite can either (a) function in the absence of
any parasitism (fitting the classic definition of facultatively parasitic), or they can survive using other
host species. Assuming parasite-host dynamics are evolutionary labile, this formulation allows us to
investigate conditions under which parasites might move evolutionarily from facultative to obligate
and/or from specialist to generalist.
2. The interactions between host and parasite can be described using a Holling Type II functional response
equation to describe the average attacking rate of a parasite, time spent searching for and handling a
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host, and time spent on other activities associated with the host-parasite relationship (Anderson and
May 1978; Skalsii and Gilliam 2001).The Holling Type II functional response is particularly suitable
for modeling social parasitism, because it allows consideration of the main challenges social parasites
face: finding a host or host colony, overcoming the defenses of that host, and exploiting its resources for
the parasite’s own reproduction (Cini et al 2011). As an example, in the case of avian brood parasites,
overcoming defenses could include the tactics employed by a parasitic adult female and in relation to
the host pair, while exploitation would consider the relationship between the chick and the host parents.
3. In the absence of co-evolution, i.e., σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0, the co-evolutionary model (5) reduces to the following
host-parasite ecological model:
dx1
dt = x1
[
r1
(
1− x1K1
)
− ax21+hax1
]
dx2
dt = x2
[
eax1
1+hax1
− d+ r2
(
1− x2K2
)]
which can be host v.s. facultative or host v.s. obligate parasites depending on the the values of r2 and
d: parasite x2 is facultative if r2 < d while it is facultative if r2 > d.
4. Social parasitism also occurs facultatively within species. However, for purposes of this model, we
assume that the host and parasite are different species; this allows us to consider them ecologically
removed that there is negligible competition for food, space or other resources beyond the social par-
asitism relationship.
In the following section, we will explore the ecological dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) when
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0 (in the absence of evolution).
3. Ecological dynamics of a host-parasite model: facultative v.s. obligate parasites
Let σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0, then the co-evolutionary dynamics of model (5) is reduced to the following ecological
model (6) with fixed traits ui, i = 1, 2 of host and parasite, respectively:
dx1
dt = x1G1(v, u, x)|v=u1 = x1H1(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x1
[
r1
(
1− x1K1(u1)
)
− a(u1,u2)x21+ha(u1,u2)x1
]
dx2
dt = x2G2(v, u, x)|v=u2 = x2H2(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x2
[
ea(u1,u2)x1
1+ha(u1,u2)x1
− d(u2) + r2
(
1− x2K2(u2)
)] (6)
whose state space is defined as X = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2+}. In addition, we define the following two sets:
X1 = {(x1, 0) ∈ X} and X2 = {(0, x2) ∈ X}.
For convenience, we let K1(u1) = K1, K2(u2) = K2, a(u1, u2) = a, and d(u2) = d for short in this section.
We have the following lemma regarding the basic dynamical properties of Model (6):
Lemma 3.1 (Basic dynamical properties). Let KM1 = supu1∈U1{K1(u1)} and KM2 = supu2∈U2{K2(u2)}.
Then the host-parasite model (6) is positively invariant and every trajectory starting in X attracts to the
compact set C = [0,KM1 ]× [0, K02(r2+
e
h
)
r2
].
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Notes: The results of Lemma 3.1 suggest that our co-evolutionary model (13) is biologically well-defined.
The host-parasite model (6) always has the following two boundary equilibria E00 = (0, 0), E10 = (K1, 0),
and it has an additional boundary equilibrium E01 =
(
0, (1− dr2 )K2
)
on the y-axis if r2 > d. The results
on the boundary equilibria of Model (6) are summarized with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Boundary equilibria). The host-parasite model (6) can have two or three boundary equi-
libria where their existence and stability is listed in Table 1:
Boundary Equilibria Stability Condition
E00 Saddle if r2 < d; Source if r2 > d.
E10 Saddle if r2+
eaK1
1+ahK1
> d; Locally asymptotically stable if r2+
eaK1
1+ahK1
< d
E01
Requires r2 > d for the existence: it is a saddle if
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
> 0
while it is locally asymptotically stable if r1a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
.
Table 1: The local stability of boundary equilibria for Model (6)
Notes: Proposition 3.1 implies that for the host-only equilibrium (K1, 0) to be locally stable (i.e. local
extinction of parasite) requires that the death rate of the parasite due to searching for all potential host
species must be larger than the sum of the parasite’s intrinsic growth rate r2 in the absence of parasitism
towards to x1 and benefits from the parasitism of x1, i.e. d > r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
. In this case, the parasite is
obligate. However, for the parasite-only equilibrium
(
0,K2
(
1− dr2
))
to be locally stable (i.e. local extinc-
tion of host) requires that the death rate of parasite due to searching for all potential host species must
be smaller than the ratio of sum of the host’s intrinsic growth rate r1 to the parasitism efficiency a, i.e.
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
> 0. This is the case when the parasite is facultative.
Theorem 3.1 (Persistence of the system). The host x1 of Model (6) is persistent in X if
d > r2 or
r1
a
> K2
(
1− d
r2
)
> 0.
The parasite x2 of Model (6) is persistent in X if
r2 +
eaK1
1 + ahK1
> d.
Moreover, Model (6) is permanent in X if either
r2 +
eaK1
1 + ahK1
> d > r2
or
r1
a
> K2
(
1− d
r2
)
> 0.
Notes: Theorem 3.1 indicates that host x1 is always persistent if r2 < d, while the parasite is always per-
sistent if r2 > d. The condition r2 > d indicates that the parasite is facultative, i.e., it is able to survive in
the absence of host x1. The coexistence of both host and parasite requires proper values of d regardless of
the parasite being facultative or obligate.
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Let F (x1) = c3x
3
1 + c2x
2
1 + c1x1 + c0 where
c3 = r1r2(ah)
2 c2 = ahr1r2(2− ahK1)
c1 = a
2hK1K2
(
r2 +
e
h − d
)
+ r1r2(1− 2ahK1) c0 = ar2K1
[
K2
(
1− dr2
)
− r1a
]
and
x1c =
−c2 −
√
c22 − 3c1c3
3c3
< x2c =
−c2 +
√
c22 − 3c1c3
3c3
.
Theorem 3.2 (Interior equilibria). Model (6) can have none, one, two or three interior equilibria de-
pending on the values of parameters. The sufficient conditions for the existence of interior equilibria are
listed in Table 2. Let (x∗1, x
∗
2) be an interior equilibrium of Model (6), then it is locally asymptotically stable
Number of Interior
Equilibria
Sufficient Conditions
None
One of the following conditions holds: (1) d > r2 +
aeK1
ahK1+1
; or
(2) r1a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
and
a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 ; or (3) K1 <
1
ah and
r1
a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
; or (4) K1 >
1
ah and
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2K1K2
< 1− dr2 .
One
One of the following conditions holds: (1)r2 < d < r2 +
aeK1
ahK1+1
;
or (2) r1a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
and
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
; or (3)
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
and F (x2c) < 0.
Two
r1
a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
and F (x2c) < 0
with x2c > 0.
Three
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
, F (x1c) > 0, and
F (x2c) < 0 with x
1
c > 0.
Table 2: The existence condition of interior equilibria for Model (6).
if the following conditions are satisfied
r2
K2
>
a
2
and
r1r2
K1K2
+
ea2
(1 + ahK1)3
> a2hK2(r2 +
e
h
). (7)
Notes: Theorem 3.2 indicates that the ecological model (6) can have one, two, or three interior equilibria
when parasite is facultative, i.e., r2 > d; while (6) can have one, or three interior equilibria when parasite
is obligate, i.e., r2 < d. Theoretically, it is possible that (6) has two interior equilibria in the singular cases
when r2 < d. We did not investigate such singular cases. The result for ignoring these singular cases is
that host persists in Model (6) whenever r2 < d. And this is different from the case when r2 > d. The
detailed results on the persistence have been provided in Theorem 3.1. In addition, we can conclude that
the inequalities (7) hold if either r2K2 is large enough or a is small enough; however, the value of d is not
presented in (7). In the case that r2 > d, then small values of K2 can lead to a unique locally stable interior
equilibrium. The existences of two or three interior equilibria suggest that under certain conditions, Model
(6) can have multiple attractors and generate complicated dynamics.
Theorem 3.3 (Global stability and extinction of one species). Model (6) has global stability at E10 =
(K1, 0) whenever the inequality d > r2+
eaK1
1+ahK1
holds. Model (6) has global stability at E01 =
(
0, (1− dr2 )K2
)
if r1a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
and one of the following conditions is satisfied
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1. a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 ; or
2. K1 <
1
ah ; or
3. K1 >
1
ah and
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2hK1K2
< 1− dr2 .
Notes: Theorem 3.3 implies that the necessary condition for the global stability of E10 is r2 < d. This
indicates that the parasite x2 cannot be facultative if host species x1 persists. If the parasite is facultative
(i.e., r2 > d), then the parasite x2 can drive the host x1 extinct locally when K2 is large enough and K1 is
small enough such that the inequalities K1r1 <
r1
a < K2
(
1− dr2
)
hold; local extinction of the host can also
occur when K2 is large enough and K1ah > 1 such that the inequality K2
(
1− dr2
)
>
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2K1
holds.
Ecological dynamics of facultative versus obligate parasites: The condition of the parasite x2 being
either facultative or obligate on host x1 has strong effects on the ecological dynamics of the host-parasite
interaction model (6). These impacts have been listed in Table 3. We can summarize the main differences
as follows:
1. Within the constraints of this model, a facultative parasite is always persistent, because it is not fully
dependent on the dynamics with its host. If the parasite is obligate, the host always persists. A
facultative parasite can cause the extinction of the host, while an obligate parasite can go extinction
itself under certain conditions.
2. When the parasite is facultative, either large values of r1aK2 or small values of r2 − d can result in its
permanence. If the parasite is obligate, both the host and the parasite can persist under intermediate
values of the parasite death rate d.
3. When the parasite is facultative, the system is prone to coexistence of both species and can produce
one, two, or three interior equilibria. When the parasite is obligate, the system can have one or
three interior equilibria. If the system has two interior equilibria, it exhibits bistability between the
parasite-only boundary attractor and the interior coexistence attractor. If the system has three interior
equilibria, it may have two interior coexistence attractors.
Notes: In the case that the parasite is facultative, i.e., d < r2, its population model can be rewritten as
dx2
dt
= x2
[
eax1
1 + hax1
+ (r2 − d)(1 − x2
K2(1− dr2 )
)
]
which can be rewritten as
dx2
dt
= x2
[
eax1
1 + hax1
+ r2(1− x2
K2
)
]
by letting
r2 → r2 − d and K2 → K2(1− d
r2
).
This is equivalent to the case when d = 0 in the host-parasite model. Thus, we can obtain the simplified
host-parasite model (8) with Holling-Type II functional responses when the parasite is facultative
dx1
dt = x1
[
r1(1− x1K1 )−
ax2
1+hax1
]
dx2
dt = x2
[
eax1
1+hax1
+ r2(1− x2K2 )
]
.
(8)
10
Cases facultative parasite (r2 > d) obligate parasite (r2 ≤ d)
Stability of E00 Source Saddle
Stability of E10 Saddle Stable if r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
< d
Stability of E01
A saddle if
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
> 0; A sink if
r1
aK2
< 1− dr2
Does not exist
Persistence of host x1
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
> 0 Always
Persistence of parasite x2 Always r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
> d > r2
Permanence of the system r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
> 0 r2 +
eaK1
1+haK1
> d > r2.
Extinction of host x1
r1
a > K2
(
1− dr2
)
and one of
the following conditions holds:
(1)K1 <
1
ah or (2)K1 >
1
ah and
K2
(
1− dr2
)
>
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2hK1
or
(3)
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
Never
Extinction of parasite x2 Never d > r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
.
Number of interior
equilibria
None, one, two, or three; This
suggests the possibility of two
types of multiple attractors: (a)
two interior attractors; and (b)
a boundary attractor and an
interior attractor.
None, one, or three; This suggests the
possibility of two interior attractors.
Table 3: The comparison of sufficient conditions that lead to different dynamical outcomes of a parasite being facultative versus
obligate for Model (6).
All the analytic results presented in this section can be applied to Model (8) by letting d = 0.
Numerical investigations and bifurcation diagrams: According to Theorem 3.2, the ecological model
(6) can have none, one, two or three interior equilibria depending on parameter values. Unfortunately, the
explicit forms of these interior equilibria are far too complicated. Our analytical results suggest that the
values of r2 and d have profound effects on the persistence of the system (see Theorem 3.1-3.3) and the
existence of the number of interior equilibria as well as the stability of these equilibria (see Theorem 3.2).
For these reasons, we use bifurcation diagrams to explore the effects of r2 and d on the system’s dynamical
patterns.
For convenience, we fix K1 = r1 = K2 = 1;h = 4; e = 0.9; a = 5 as a typical example. Figure 1 illustrates
the number of interior equilibria under this set of parameter values by varying both r2 and d from 0.01 to
1.5 where the white region means no interior equilibrium; the black region means one interior equilibrium;
the blue region means two interior equilibria; and the red region means three interior equilibria. The solid
black line is d = r2+
eaK1
1+ahK1
below which there is no interior equilibrium. This is supported by Theorem 3.3:
Model (6) has global stability at E10 = (K1, 0) whenever the inequality d > r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
holds. In Figure 1,
we can observe that Model (6) has none, one , two, or three interior equilibria when r2 > d while the system
has none, one, or three interior equilibria when r2 < d. This confirms our results in Theorem 3.2 and Table 2.
Let r2 = 0.25 (see the dashed black line in Figure 1); we perform an additional bifurcation diagram of the
stability of interior equilibria with respect to d, as shown in Figure 2, under the same set of parameter values:
blue means locally asymptotically stable; green means saddle; and red means source. Figure 2 shows that
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Figure 1: Multiple attractors: Bifurcation diagram of d v.s. r2 for the number of interior equilibrium when K1 = r1 = K2 =
1; h = 4; e = 0.9; a = 5: the while region means no interior equilibrium; the black region means one interior equilibrium;
the blue region means two interior equilibria; and the red region means three interior equilibria. The solid line is
d = r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
= r2 + 3/14. When the parasite is facultative, i.e., d < r2, the ecological system (6) can process none,
one, two, or three interior equilibria while parasite is obligate, i.e., d > r2, the system can process none, one, or three interior
equilibria.
when d is small (e.g.,d ∈ (0, 0.1)), there is no interior equilibrium; as d increases (e.g.,d ∈ (0.1, 0.2)), Model
(6) goes through a saddle node bifurcation (around d = 0.1) which gives one saddle interior equilibrium
and one stable interior equilibrium along with the local stable boundary equilibrium
(
0,K2
(
1− dr2
))
; d
continues to increase (e.g.,d ∈ (0.2, 0.215)), there are three interior equilibria where one is a sink, the second
is a saddle and the last is also a sink; further increasing d destabilizes the third interior equilibrium (e.g.,
there is a hopf-bifurcation occurring at the third interior equilibrium around d = 0.215); larger d makes the
system go through a cusp bifurcation (occurring around d = 0.27) which leads to only one stable interior
equilibrium; at the extreme value of d (i.e., d > r2+
eaK1
1+ahK1
), the system has global stability at the host-only
boundary equilibrium (K1, 0).
One of the interesting questions addressed by the model is what happens to the local stable boundary
equilibrium
(
0,K2
(
1− dr2
))
when the system has two interior equilibria after we allow evolution to occur
(i.e., σi > 0, i = 1, 2). Can evolution destabilize this boundary equilibrium and save the host from extinction?
We will explore this analytically and numerically in the next section on the co-evolutionary dynamics of (5).
4. Co-evolutionary dynamics
Define
au1 =
∂a(u1, u2)
∂u1
, au2 =
∂a(u1, u2)
∂u2
, au1u1 =
∂2a(u1, u2)
∂u21
,
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams when K1 = r1 = K2 = 1; r2 = 0.2;h = 4; e = 0.9; a = 5: blue means locally asymptotically
stable; green means saddle; and red means source. When the parasite is facultative, i.e., d < r2, the ecological system (6) can
process none, one, two, or three interior equilibria, while the parasite is obligate, i.e., d > r2, the system can process none, one,
or three interior equilibria. In addition, large values of d can destabilize the system and lead to the extinction of the parasite.
and
au2u2 =
∂2a(u1, u2)
∂u22
, au1u2 =
∂2a(u1, u2)
∂u1∂u2
=
∂2a(u1, u2)
∂u1∂u2
.
Assume that u∗1, u
∗
2 are trait values such that
K ′1(u
∗
1) = K
′
2(u
∗
2) = au1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = au2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = d
′(u∗2) = 0
and let
K1 = K1(u
∗
1), K2 = K2(u
∗
2), a = a(u
∗
1, u
∗
2), and d = d(u
∗
2).
Then according to Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, the co-evolutionary model (5) can have the boundary
equilibria (0, 0, u∗1, u
∗
2), Ex10u1u2 = (K1, 0, u
∗
1, u
∗
2), E0x2u1u2 =
(
0,K2
(
1− dr2
)
, u∗1, u
∗
2
)
and potentially mul-
tiple interior equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) depending on the values of Ki, ri, i = 1, 2 and d, a. In general, the
following theorem provides the existence and local stability results on the facultative-parasite-only equilib-
rium E0x2u1u2 and the host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2 for the co-evolutionary model (5):
Theorem 4.1. The host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2 = (K1, 0, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) exists if
K ′1(u
∗
1) = 0 and d
′(u∗2) =
eK1(u
∗
1)au2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2)
(1 + ha(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1))
2
and it is locally asymptotically stable if the following inequalities hold
0 <
ea(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1)
1 + ha(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1)
< d(u∗2)− r2, K ′′1 (u∗1) < 0,
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and
eK1(u
∗
1)
[
au2u2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2)(1 + haK1(u
∗
1))− 2K1(u∗1)a2u2(u∗1, u∗2)
]
(1 + ha(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1))
3
< d′′(u∗2).
The parasite-only equilibrium E0x2u1u2 =
(
0,K2
(
1− dr2
)
u∗1, u
∗
2
)
exists if
au1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = 0, d(u
∗
2) < r2 and d
′(u∗2) =
r2K
′
2(u
∗
2)
K2(u∗2)
and it is locally asymptotically stable if the following inequalities hold
r1
a(u∗1, u
∗
2)
< K2(u
∗
2)
(
1− d(u
∗
2)
r2
)
, au1u1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) > 0,
and
r2
(
1− d(u∗2)r2
) [
K2(u
∗
2)K
′′
2 (u
∗
2)− 2(K ′2(u∗2))2
]
K2(u∗2)
2
< d′′(u∗2).
Notes: According to Proposition 3.1, the extinction equilibrium E00 is alway unstable for the ecological
model (6). The host-only equilibrium E10 is locally asymptotically stable when r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
< d. This
condition implies that social parasite should be obligate, i.e., r2 < d. The facultative-social-parasite-only
equilibrium E01 is locally asymptotically stable when the inequality
r1
aK2
< 1 − dr2 holds. The results of
Theorem 4.1 imply that the local stability of the facultative-social-parasite-only equilibrium E0x2u1u2 and
the host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2 are determined by the concavity of the trait function Ki(vi), i = 1, 2 and
a(v1, v2) evaluated at the equilibrium under conditions that the equilibrium is Ecologically Stable (i.e., ES).
If the death rate due to parasitism d is independent of the trait value u2, then we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.1. The host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2 exists if K
′
1(u
∗
1) = au2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = 0, and it is locally
asymptotically stable if the following inequalities hold
0 <
ea(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1)
1 + ha(u∗1, u
∗
2)K1(u
∗
1)
< d− r2, K ′′1 (u∗1) < 0, and au2u2(u∗1, u∗2) < 0.
The parasite-only equilibrium E0x2u1u2 exists if K
′
2(u
∗
2) = au1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = 0, and it is locally asymptotically
stable if the following inequalities hold
r1
a(u∗1, u
∗
2)
< K2(u
∗
2)
(
1− d
r2
)
, au1u1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) > 0, and K
′′
2 (u
∗
2) < 0.
4.1. Boundary equilibria and ESS
The trait functions can have many forms, such as Gaussian distributions, polynomial, exponential func-
tions (Abrams 1990; Bergelson et al 2001; Mostowy and Engelsta¨dter 2011; Nuismer et al 2012; Landi et
al 2013). In this subsection, we apply the results of Theorem 4.1 and its Corollary 4.1 to some specific
trait functions to explore how these functions affect whether or not the boundary equilibrium Ex10u1u2 or
E0x2u1u2 can have ESS. More specifically, we assume that
Ki(vi) = K0ie
−
v2
i
(vi−c)
2
2σ2
Ki , a(v1, v2) = a0e
−
(v1−v2+c)
2(v1−v2−c)
2
2σ4a , and d(v2) = d0e
−
(v2−c)
2(v2+c)
2
2σ2
d , i = 1, 2
where c > 0 and vi ∈ [0, c]. These chosen trait functions are modified from Gaussian distributions.
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4.1.1. The fixed parasite death rate
In this subsection, we apply the results of Corollary 4.1 to particular trait functions when the death rate
d of the parasite due to attacking all potential hosts is independent of the trait u2. Let trait values set be
Ui = [0, c], i = 1, 2. We assume that Ki(vi) = K0ie
−
v2
i
(vi−c)
2
2σ2
Ki , i = 1, 2 and a(v1, v2) = a0e
−
(v1−v2+c)
2(v1−v2−c)
2
2σ4a
which gives follows:
K ′i0) = Ki(c) = K01, a(0, 0) = a(c, c) = a0e
−
c4
4σ2a , a(0, c) = a(c, 0) = a0, i = 1, 2
K ′i(0) = K
′
i(c) = avi(0, 0) = avi(c, c) = avi(0, c) = avi(c, 0), i = 1, 2
K ′′i (0) = K
′′
i (c) = −
K0ic
2
σ2Ki
< 0, avivi(0, 0) = avivi(c, c) =
a0c
2e
−
c2
σ4a
σ2a
> 0,
and
avivi(0, c) = avivi(c, 0) = −
2a0c
2
σ2a
< 0.
This implies that the trait dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) are positively invariant in the trait
space U1 × U2 = [0, c]× [0, c].
The parasite-only equilibrium: According to Corollary 4.1, the parasite-only equilibrium E0x2u1u2 =(
0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, u∗1, u
∗
2∗
)
is locally asymptotically stable (i.e., CS) if the following conditions hold
K
′
2(u
∗
2) = au1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = 0,
r1
1− d
r2
< a0K02e
−
c4
4σ4a , au1u1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) =
a0c
2e
−
c2
σ4a
σ2a
> 0, and K′′2 (u
∗
2) < 0 (9)
where (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) or (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (c, c). Then the fitness functions of host and parasite at E0x2u1u2 are
represented as follows:
G1(v1, u
∗, x∗) = r1 − a(v1, u∗2)K02
(
1− dr2
)
= r1 − a0K02
(
1− dr2
)
e
−
(v1−u
∗
2+c)
2(v1−u
∗
2−c)
2
4σ2a
G2(v2, u
∗, x∗) = −d+ r2
(
1− K02
(
1− d
r2
)
K2(v2)
)
= −d+ r2
(
1−
(
1− dr2
)
e
v22(v2−c)
2
2σ2
K2
)
which gives
max
v1∈U1
{G1(v1, u∗, x∗)} = G1(u∗1, u∗, x∗) = r1 − a0K02
(
1− d
r2
)
e
−
c4
4σ2a < 0
and
max
v2∈U2
{G2(v2, u∗, x∗)} = G2(u∗2, u∗, x∗) = −d+ r2
(
1−
(
1− d
r2
))
= 0.
Therefore, according to the definition of ESS (i.e., (2)), we can conclude that the two parasite-only equilib-
rium
(
0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, 0, 0
)
and
(
0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, c, c
)
of the co-evolutionary model (5) are ESS.
Biological scenarios: The case studied above suggest that the parasite-only-equilibrium E0x2u1u2 can have
two ESS strategies (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (c, c) when the parasite is facultative (i.e., d < r2). This
may describe the case of facultative slavemakers, such as Formica subnuda whose colonies can survive as
slaveless (Savolainen and Deslippe 1996).
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The host-only equilibrium: According to Corollary 4.1, the host-only equilibriumEx10u1u2 = (K01, 0, u
∗
1, u
∗
2)
is locally asymptotically stable if the following conditions hold
K
′
1(u
∗
1) = au2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = 0,
ea0K01
1 + ha0K01
< d− r2, au2u2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = −
2a0c
2
σ2a
< 0, and K′′2 (u
∗
2) < 0 (10)
where (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, c) or (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (c, 0). Then the fitness functions of host and parasite at Ex10u1u2 are
represented as follows:
G1(v1, u
∗, x∗) = r1

1− K01
K01e
−
v21(v1−c)
2
2σ2
K1

 = r1
(
1− e
v21(v1−c)
2
2σ2
K1
)
G2(v2, u
∗, x∗) =
ea(u∗1 ,v2)K01
1+ha(u∗1 ,v2)K01
− d+ r2 = −d+ r2 + eK01a0e
−
(u∗1−v2+c)
2(u∗1−v2−c)
2
2σ4a
1+hK01a0e
−
(u∗
1
−v2+c)
2(u∗
1
−v2−c)
2
2σ4a
which gives
max
v1∈U1
{G1(v1, u∗, x∗)} = G1(u∗1, u∗, x∗) = 0
and
max
v2∈U2
{G2(v2, u∗, x∗)} = G2(u∗2, u∗, x∗) = −d+ r2 +
ea0K01
1 + ha0K01
< 0.
Therefore, according to (2), the two host-only equilibria (K01, 0, 0, c) and (K01, 0, c, 0) of the co-evolutionary
model (5) are ESS.
Biological scenarios: The cases studied above suggest that for the trait functions given, the host-only equi-
librium Ex10u1u2 of the co-evolutionary model (5) can have two ESS (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (0, c) and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (c, 0)
when the parasite is obligate (i.e., d > r2). This can be classified as one co-evolutionary outcome when the
host successfully resists invasion by the parasite, resistance occurs via effective front-line defenses (Kilner
and Langmore 2011). For example, Ortolani and Cervo (2010) show that Polistes dominulus foundresses are
now so large and aggressive that they consistently defend their nests from attack by the brood parasite P.
sulcifer, and that parasitism is rarely seen.
4.1.2. The parasite death rate depending on its trait
Our application of Corollary 4.1 in the previous subsection indicates that both boundary equilibria
Ex10u1u2 and E0x2u1u2 cannot simultaneously have ESS strategies, due to the fact that d and r2 are fixed.
The interesting questions become, if the death rate d of the parasite also depends on its trait u2, can Model
(5) have both boundary equilibria Ex10u1u2 and E0x2u1u2 being locally asymptotically stable (i.e.,
CS) under different trait values of u2? If it can, is it possible for these two boundary equilibria
to have ESS?
To investigate these questions, we should apply the results of Theorem 4.1 by letting d depend on the trait
value u2. To continue our study, we choose d(v2) = d0e
−
(v2−c)
2(v2+c)
2
2σ2
d which has the following properties:
d(0) = d0e
−c4
2σ2
d
,
d(c) = d0, d
′(0) = d′(c) = 0, d′′(0) =
2d0c
2e
−
c2
σ2
d
σ2d
> 0, and d′′(c) = −4d0c
2
σ2d
< 0.
If we assume that Ki(vi), i = 1, 2 and a(v1, v2) have the same trait functions as before, then we can conclude
that the trait dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) are positively invariant in the trait space U1×U2 =
[0, c] × [0, c]; and the equilibrium trait values (u∗1, u∗2) are u∗i = 0 or c for both i = 1, 2. According to
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Theorem 4.1, we can conclude that both boundary equilibria Ex10u1u2 = (K01, 0, 0, c) and E0x2u1u2 =(
0,K02
(
1− d0r2
)
, 0, 0
)
have convergence stability if the following conditions hold:
d0σ
4
a(1 + a0hK01)
σ2d
<
ea0K01
1 + a0hK01
< d0 − r2 and r1 < a0K02e−
c4
2σ4a

1− d0e−
c4
2σ2
d
r2

 .
For example, if we let
r1 = 0.1, r2 = 1.5 < d0 = 2.1, a0 = 2, e = .9, h = c = σK1 = σK2 = K01 = 1, K02 = 100, σd = 1.05, σa = .56,
then both Ex10u1u2 = (K01, 0, 0, c) and E0x2u1u2 =
(
0,K02
(
1− d0r2
)
, 0, c
)
are locally asymptotically stable
(CS). However, the equilibrium trait (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, c) is not ESS for Ex10u1u2 = (K01, 0, 0, c); and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) =
(0, 0) is not ESS for E0x2u1u2 =
(
0,K02
(
1− d0e
−
c4
2σ2
d
r2
)
, 0, 0
)
. See the fitness functions Gi(vi, u
∗, x∗), i =
1, 2 for these two boundary equilibria shown in Figure 3-4: Figure 3(a) and 4(a) show that the strate-
gies (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, c) and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) are ESS for the host at the boundary equilibrium (K01, 0),(
0,K02
(
1− d0e
−
c4
2σ2
d
r2
))
, respectively. However, Figure 3(b) and 4(b) show that these strategies are not
ESS for the parasite at these boundary equilibria, since there are trait values v2 such that G2(v2, u
∗, x∗) > 0.
(a) The fitness function of host (i.e., G1(v1, u∗, x∗)) with u∗ =
(0, c) and x∗ = (K01, 0)
(b) The fitness function of parasite (i.e., G2(v2, u∗, x∗)) with
u∗ = (0, c) and x∗ = (K01, 0)
Figure 3: The fitness functions of host (i.e., G1(v1, u∗, x∗)) and of parasite (i.e., G2(v2, u∗, x∗)) for the co-evolutionary model (5)
when r1 = 0.1, r2 = 1.5 < d0 = 2.1, a0 = 2, e = 0.9, h = c = σK1 = σK2 = K01 = 1, K02 = 100, σd = 1.05, σa = 0.56. The
strategy u∗ = (0, 0) is not an ESS, because there are trait values v2 such that G2(v2, u∗, x∗) > 0. However, the co-evolutionary
system has local stability at (u∗, x∗).
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(a) The fitness function of host (i.e., G1(v1, u∗, x∗)) with u∗ =
(0, 0) and x∗ =

0, K02

1− d0e
−
c4
2σ2
d
r2




(b) The fitness function of parasite (i.e., G2(v2, u∗, x∗)) with
u∗ = (0, 0) and x∗ =

0, K02

1− d0e
−
c4
2σ2
d
r2




Figure 4: The fitness functions of host (i.e., G1(v1, u∗, x∗)) and of parasite (i.e., G2(v2, u∗, x∗)) for the co-evolutionary model
(5) when r1 = 0.1, r2 = 1.5 < d0 = 2.1, a0 = 2, e = 0.9, h = c = σK1 = σK2 = K01 = 1, K02 = 100, σd = 1.05, σa = 0.56.
The strategy u∗ = (0, c) is not ESS for since since there are trait values v2 such that G2(v2, u∗, x∗) > 0. However, the
co-evolutionary system has local stability at (u∗, x∗).
Biological scenarios and implications: The case studied above suggests that a host and parasite can
employ multiple strategies that generate convergence stability but not ESS. This may be due to the in-
teractions of different strategies and counter-strategies acquired at different stages of co-evolution (Kilner
and Langmore 2011). For example, parasites may initially be facultative, then acquire host-specific signa-
tures, but through counter-selection by hosts may subsequently revert to genetic signatures expressed before
parasitism. As one possible example, among the insects, selection to become chemically insignificant may
have facilitated the ability to acquire host hydrocarbon signatures previously after parasitism (Kilner and
Langmore 2011). Such a case could be applied to slave-making ants, which can be either obligate social par-
asites, depending on enslaved hosts ants throughout their whole lives (Topoff and Zimmerli 1991; Ruano et
al. 2013) or alternatively facultative slave-makers. Facultative slave-making ants, like those in the Formica
sanguinea complex, may engage in slave making, but individual colonies are able to revert to producing
their own workers if parasitized workers are removed (Topoff and Zimmerli 1991). They could represent an
intermediate parasitic group, between freeliving species on the one hand, and obligate slave-making species
on the other.
4.2. Trait functions follow Gaussian distributions
To continue our analytical study, we focus on the co-evolutionary dynamics of Model (5) for chosen trait
functions of Ki(vi) and a(v1, v2). For the rest of the section, we let the death rate d of the parasite x2 be
independent of the trait u2; and we assume the following functional forms for the carrying capacity Ki(vi)
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and the parasitism efficiency a(v1, v2):
Ki(vi) = K0ie
−
v2
i
2σ2
Ki
a(v1, v2) = a0e
−
(v1−v2)
2
2σ2a
(11)
a(v1, v2) denotes the parasitism efficiency of a parasite with phenotypic trait v2 on host individuals with
phenotypic trait v1 with the assumption that the stronger host-parasite interactions are, the more similar
host and parasite traits are. The symmetric form of a in (11) has been previously used in the study of
character displacement by Taper and Case (1992), which assumes that the parasitism efficiency is normally
distributed around a maximum value of a0 with a variance σ
2
a as a function of trait difference in the parasite
and host v1 − v2. The larger value of σ2a, the greater sensitivity of the parasitism efficiency a changes with
respect to the changes in trait difference v1 − v2. There are other alternative functions of a (see Dieckmann
and Marrow 1995; Doebeli and Dieckmann 2000; Zu et al 2007), for example, the asymmetrical predation
efficiency a which has been previously used in the study of character displacement can be described as
a(v1, v2) = a0e
(σ2aβ)
2
2 e
−
(v1−v2+σ
2
aβ)
2
2σ2a
(12)
where β 6= 0 (Doebeli and U. Dieckmann 2000). We also assume that the resource availability for the host
and parasite varies with their phenotypic trait vi, which follows a Gaussian distribution N(0, σ
2
Ki
). This
distribution assumes that the maximum inherent equilibrium level K0i for each individual single species xi,
using strategy vi, in the absence of other species, is attained at trait vi = 0, and that Ki(vi) is normally
distributed around vi = 0 with variance σ
2
Ki
. The larger variance σ2Ki , the greater sensitivity of the carrying
capacity Ki(vi) changes with respect to the changes in the trait vi. Fix the trait value of the parasite u2,
the formulations of K1(v1) and a(v1, u2) indicate that increases in the host’s trait value |v1| result in the
decreased values of K1(v1) and a(v1, u2) when v1 < 0 or v1 > u2 but can result in the increased values of a
when v1 ∈ (0, u2). This implies that there is a trade-off between the carrying capacity of the host and the
parasitism efficiency for a certain range of v1 when v1 < 0 or v1 > u2. On the other hand, for a fixed host’s
trait value u1, there is no such trade-off for the parasite when v2 < 0 or v2 > u1 but a trade-off exists when
v2 ∈ (0, u1).
As a consequence, the co-evolutionary dynamics of the monomorphic resident host and parasite popula-
tions with residence traits of u1 and u2 in the host, parasite, respectively, are given by the following set of
nonlinear equations:
dx1
dt = x1G1(v1, u, x)|v1=u1 = x1H1(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x1
[
r1(1 − x1K1(u1) )−
a(u1,u2)x2
1+ha(u1,u2)x1
]
dx2
dt = x2G2(v2, u, x)|v2=u2 = x2H2(u1, u2, x1, x2) = x2
[
ea(u1,u2)x1
1+ha(u1,u2)x1
− d+ r2(1 − x2K2(u2) )
]
du1
dt = σ
2
1
∂G1(v1,u,x)
∂v1
∣∣
v1=u1
= σ21
∂H1(u1,u2,x1,x2)
∂u1
= σ21
[
− r1x1u1
σ2
K1
K1(u1)
+ (u1−u2)x2a(u1,u2)σ2a(1+ha(u1,u2)x1)2
]
,
du2
dt = σ
2
2
∂G2(v2,u,x)
∂v2
∣∣
v2=u2
= σ22
∂H2(u1,u2,x1,x2)
∂u2
= σ22
[
− r2x2u2
σ2
K2
K2(u2)
+ e(u1−u2)x1a(u1,u2)σ2a(1+ha(u1,u2)x1)2
]
,
(13)
where we take a with the symmetric form given in (11). Since the death rate of the parasite x2 does not
change over time, thus the difference of r2 and d determines whether the parasite is facultative or obligate:
the parasite is facultative when r2 > d ≥ 0, and is obligate when d > r2 ≥ 0. Our model (13) allows us to
investigate the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of the host and parasite interactions, where the parasite
can be either obligate or facultative. In particular, Model (13) includes the special case which is studied by
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Zu et al. (2007).
Assume that (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) is an equilibrium of the co-evolutionary host-parasite model (13). We say
(x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) is a boundary equilibrium if x
∗
1x
∗
2 = 0 while it is an interior equilibrium if x
∗
1x
∗
2 > 0. The
equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) satisfies the following equations
dx1
dt
= 0⇒ x1 = 0 or r1
(
1− x1
K1(u1)
)
=
a(u1, u2)x2
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
(14)
dx2
dt
= 0⇒ x2 = 0 or ea(u1, u2)x1
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
+ r2
(
1− x2
K2(u2)
)
= d (15)
du1
dt
= 0⇒ r1x1u1
σ2K1K1(u1)
=
(u1 − u2)x2a(u1, u2)
σ2a(1 + ha(u1, u2)x1)
2
, (16)
du2
dt
= 0⇒ r2x2u2
σ2K2K2(u2)
=
e(u1 − u2)x1a(u1, u2)
σ2a(1 + ha(u1, u2)x1)
2
. (17)
We have the following proposition regarding the boundary equilibria of (13) and their stability.
Theorem 4.2. [Equilibria of the evolutionary model (13)] The evolutionary model (13) always has
the following two boundary equilibria E0000 = (0, 0, 0, 0), Ex1000 = (K01, 0, 0, 0) where Ex1000 is locally
asymptotically stable if r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
< d and it is a saddle if r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
> d. In addition, the following
statements are true:
1. If r2 > d, then Model (13) has the third boundary equilibrium E0x200 = (0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, 0, 0). Both
E0000 and E0x200 are always saddles.
2. Model (13) can have one, two, or three interior equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) where (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is an interior
equilibrium of the ecological model (6) by letting K1 = K01, K2 = K02 and a = a0.
3. The interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is locally asymptotically stable if the following conditions hold:
min
{
2r2
K02
, r1
σ2
K1
K01
}
> a0,
r1r2
K01K02
+
ea20
(1+a0hK01)3
> a20hK02(r2 +
e
h ), and
max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
>
x∗2
x∗1
. (18)
Notes: According to Corollary 4.1, one necessary condition for E0x2u1u2 being locally asymptotically sta-
ble is that au1u1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) > 0. The results of Theorem 4.2 imply that the boundary equilibrium E0x200 =
(0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, 0, 0) cannot be locally stable, since au1u1(0, 0) < 0. Considering the result in Theorem
4.1 indicates that the trait function of parasitism efficiency a(u1, u2) plays an important role in determin-
ing whether the boundary equilibrium E0x200 can be locally stable or not. In addition, Condition (18) in
Theorem 4.2 indicates that a large ratio of the host (or parasite) intrinsic growth rate r1 to the maximum
carrying capacity of host (or parasite ) K01, a large ratio of variance of the carrying capacity of parasite
to host, i.e.
σK2
σK1
, and large values of the variance of the trait difference of parasitism efficiency a, can lead
to local stability of the coexistence of host and parasite (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0). According to Theorem 3.1, for fixed
values of ri,K0i, a0, e, the proper value of d can guarantee the permanence of the ecological system, and thus
guarantee the existence of the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2). In the rest of this subsection, we will focus on
the ESS of the host-only boundary equilibrium Ex1,0,0,0 and the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0).
Theorem 4.3. [ESS of co-evolutionary model (13)] The strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of the boundary equi-
librium Ex1000 is an ESS if the following inequality holds
r2 +
ea0K01
1 + a0hK01
< d.
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The strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESS if Condition (18) holds and
the following inequalities hold
r1
σ2
K1
K01
>
max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
a0
σ2a
. (19)
Notes: By simple rearrangements, we have the following two equivalent equations:
r1
σ2K1K01
>
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
a0
σ2a
⇔ σ
2
a
σK1σK2
>
√
eK01K02
r1r2
a0
and
r1
σ2K1K01
>
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
a0
σ2a
⇔ σK1σK2 < 1.
Thus, according to the proof of Theorem 4.2 and 4.3, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4.2. Assume the following inequalities hold
min
{ 2r2
K02
,
r1
σ2K1K01
}
> a0,
r1r2
K01K02
+
ea20
(1 + a0hK01)3
> a20hK02(r2 +
e
h
).
The strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESS if one of the following
conditions holds
1.
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
>
x∗2
x∗1
and
σ2a
σK1σK2
>
√
eK01K02
r1r2
a0.
2.
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
>
x∗2
x∗1
and σK1σK2 < 1.
Notes: By comparing the results of Theorem 4.2 with Theorem 4.3 and its corollary 4.2, we can conclude
that the variances of the proposed trait functions, i.e., σK1 , σK2 and σd, play essential roles in guarantee-
ing the local stable interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) having an ESS. More specifically, large variances of
the parasite carrying capacity σK2 and of the parasitism efficiency σa are required to make sure that the
strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESS but it may not be global ESS because it is possible that
the system has other ESS strategies for coexistence. This can be considered as a tolerance of the parasite
co-evolutionary outcome, where hosts not only concede to the parasite and accept it in their nests, but also
make adjustments to their life history (or other traits) to minimize the negative effects of parasitism on their
fitness (Kilner and Langmore 2011). This co-evolutionary outcome is more likely be the case that complete
parasitic control of the co-evolutionary trajectory. This could fit with the ecological findings of imperfect
recognition of parasite eggs, and a low but positive level of acceptance of brood parasitism by some cuckoo
and cowbird host species (Davies et al 1996; reviewed by Kruuger 2007).
Theorem 4.4. [The unique ESS of the co-evolutionary model (13)] The strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of the
boundary equilibrium Ex1000 is the unique ESS of the co-evolutionary host-parasite model (13) if the following
inequality holds
r2 +
ea0K01
1 + ahK01
< d.
Assume that σK2 > σK1 , then the strategy (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) of the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is the
unique ESS of the co-evolutionary host-parasite model (13) whenever the following conditions hold
K02a0 <
r1
1− d
r2
, K01a0 <
1
h
min
{
2r2
K02
, r1
σ2
K1
K01
}
> a0,
r1r2
K01K02
+
ea20
(1+a0hK01)3
> a20hK02(r2 +
e
h ) and
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
>
x∗2
x∗1
,
σ2a
σK1σK2
>
√
eK01K02
r1r2
a0.
(20)
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Notes: Theorem 4.4 provides sufficient conditions when Model (13) has a unique ESS. One direct impli-
cation is that if (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, 0) is an ESS of the host-only boundary equilibrium Ex1000, then Model (13)
cannot have other locally asymptotically stable equilibrium. Thus a large death rate due to the parasite
hunting/attacking the host can lead to the extinction of the parasite, and lead to a successful resistance by
hosts evolutionary outcome (Kilner and Langmore 2011).
On the other hand, when the ratio of the variance of the parasite to the host is larger than 1, i.e.,
σK2
σK1
> 1,
small values of a0 can lead to the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) being the only equilibrium of the co-
evolutionary model (13) having ESS. This type co-evolutionary outcome is referred to as acceptance of the
parasite, which can be considered an adaptive strategy for hosts when the costs of rearing a parasite are, on
average, lower than any recognition costs (reviewed by Kruuger 2007; Kilner and Langmore 2011).
Our analysis suggests that it is possible for Model (13) to have multiple interior equilibria with potential
ESS in the following scenarios:
1. The condition σK2 > σK1 does not hold in Theorem 4.4.
2. The ecological model can have multiple stable equilibria which also can have ESS.
We have been focusing on the equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) of the co-evolutionary model (13) when u
∗
1 =
u∗2 = 0. It is possible that our model (13) has an equilibrium with u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0. See the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. If (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) is an equilibrium of the co-evolutionary model (13) with u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0, then
we have x∗1x
∗
2 > 0, and x
∗
1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2 can be solved from the following equations:
x∗1 = f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) =
x∗2
g(u∗1, u
∗
2)
= f2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) and
r1u
∗
1
σ2K1K1(u
∗
1)
=
(u∗1 − u∗2)g(u∗1, u∗2)a(u∗1, u∗2)
σ2a (1 + ha(u
∗
1, u
∗
2)f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2))
2
where
g(u1, u2) =
√
er1σ2K2
u1K2(u2)
r2σ2K1
u2K1(u1)
f1(u1, u2) =
K1
2 − r1+aK1g2r1ah +
√
(r1+aK1g)
2+r1ahK1(r1ahK1+2r1−2K1g)
2r1ah
f2(u1, u2) =
K2
2g +
aeK2
2r2ahg
− 12ah +
√
(r2g−aeK2)
2+r2ahK2(r2ahK2+2r2g+2eaK2)
2r1ah
.
Notes: Since our trait functions are even function, so are fi(u1, u2) and g(u1, u2), i.e.,
f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = f1(−u∗1,−u∗2), f2(u∗1, u∗2) = f2(−u∗1,−u∗2) and g(u∗1, u∗2) = g(−u∗1,−u∗2).
Therefore, if (u∗1, u
∗
2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is an interior equilibrium of Model (13), then so is (−u∗1,−u∗2, x∗1, x∗2). Propo-
sition (4.1) suggests that the co-evolutionary model (13) could have multiple interior equilibria, and have
potential multiple interior ESS, with different trait values. Since we are not able to solve the interior equi-
librium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) explicitly for the case of u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0, we use numerical simulations to illustrate typical
scenarios of the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) when u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0. We are particularly interested in the
co-evolutionary outcomes when the parasite is facultative, i.e., r2 > d. As an example, we fix the values of
parameters as follows
K01 = r1 = K02 = 1; a0 = 5; h = 4; e = 0.9; r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185.
We would like to note that the chosen parameter values represent typical dynamics of Model (13) when the
ecological model (6) processes two interior equilibria, e.g., the blue region of Figure 1.
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According to Figure 2, we can see that, under this set of parameter values, the ecological model (6) has one
saddle interior equilibrium; one stable interior equilibrium (0.5428, 1.0841); and one stable boundary equilib-
rium (0, 0.26). Depending on initial conditions, the trajectory of (6) will converge to either (0.5428, 1.0841)
or (0, 0.26). For example, if we take (x1(0), x2(0)) = (0.5, 2) as the initial conditions, the ecological model
(6) converges to the parasite-only boundary equilibrium (0, 0.26). After we turn on evolution, we have the
co-evolutionary model (13). According to Corollary 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, the parasite-only boundary equi-
librium (0, 0.26, 0, 0) is unstable.
To investigate the co-evolutionary outcome, we fix the initial conditions (x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) =
(0.5, 2, 1, 0.1), let σK1 = σK2 = 1, and vary the value of σa. More specifically, we simulate the dynamics of
the co-evolutionary model (13) when σa = 2, 1, 0.5, 0.15, 0.05, 0.005. The simulations are shown in Figure
5-9 where the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for host u1 is green; and the trait value for
parasite u2 is cyan: When σa = 2, the co-evolutionary model (5) converges to the stable interior equilibrium
(0.0102, 0.3452, 2.3846, 0.1287) locally (see Figure 5); When σa = 1, the co-evolutionary model (5) converges
to the stable interior equilibrium (0.0619, 0.4984, 1.8290, 0.4813) locally (see Figure 6); When σa = 0.5, the
co-evolutionary model (5) converges to the stable interior equilibrium (0.5428, 1.0841, 0, 0) (see Figure 7).
However, when σa = 0.15, 0.05, the co-evolutionary model (5) has fluctuating dynamics (see Figure 8-9).
And when the value of σa is small enough, e.g., σa = 0.005, the co-evolutionary model (5) has fluctuating
dynamics first but eventually converges to the stable interior equilibrium (0.5428, 1.0841, 0, 0) (see Figure
10). These simulations suggest follows:
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Figure 5: The stable interior equilibrium is (0.0102, 0.3452, 2.3846, 0.1287). The dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5)
when σK1 = σK2 = K01 = r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4, σa = 2 with initial values
(x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for the host u1 is green;
and the trait value for the parasite u2 is cyan.
1. The stable interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) with u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0: The co-evolutionary model (13)
can indeed have locally stable interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) with u
∗
1u
∗
2 6= 0 (see Figure 5 and
6). This occurs when the ecological dynamics (6) has two attractors in the absence of evolution: the
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Figure 6: The stable interior equilibrium is (0.0619, 0.4984, 1.8290, 0.4813). The dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5)
when σK1 = σK2 = K01 = r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4, σa = 1 with initial values
(x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for host u1 is green; and
the trait value for the parasite u2 is cyan.
parasite-only equilibrium
(
0,K02
(
1− dr2
))
and the interior attractor where both the host and parasite
coexist.
2. ESS or not: Calculations show that: (a) when σa = 2, 1, the co-evolutionary model (5) converges
to the stable interior equilibrium (0.0102, 0.3452, 2.3846, 0.1287), (0.0619, 0.4984, 1.8290, 0.4813) locally,
respectively, which are not ESS; and (b) when σa = 0.5, 0.005, the co-evolutionary model (5) converges
to the stable interior equilibrium (0.5428, 1.0841, 0, 0) where the strategy (0, 0) is an ESS.
3. Evolution can save the host from local extinction by creating new stable interior equilibria
(see Figure 5-6) or shifting the basins of attractions (see Figure 7): In the absence of evolution,
under the condition of K01 = r1 = K02 = 1; a0 = 5; h = 4; e = 0.9; r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185 and
(x1(0), x2(0)) = (0.5, 2), the ecological model (6) converges to the parasite-only equilibrium (0, 0.26);
However, in the presence of evolution, the co-evolutionary model (5) can converge to the stable interior
equilibrium locally where both the host and parasite can coexist.
4. Effects of the variance σa of the trait difference in the parasitism efficiency a(u1, u2): Small
values of σa can destabilize the evolutionary dynamics and generate oscillations between population and
trait dynamics (see Figure 8-9), while extremely small values of σa can cause catastrophe events where
the large oscillations collapse with the boundary of the basins attractions of the stable interior equi-
librium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) with the consequence that the trajectory converges to (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) (see Figure 10).
5. Host-parasite cycles when σa is small: Compare the direction of host-parasite cycles in Figure
11(a) to Figure 11(b): For σa = 0.15, both host and parasite exhibit their peaks at almost the same
time, but when σa = 0.05, the host peaks at the lowest population of the parasite and the parasite peaks
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Figure 7: The stable interior equilibrium is (0.5428, 1.0841, 0, 0). The dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) when
σK1 = σK2 = K01 = r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4, σa = 0.5 with initial values
(x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for the host u1 is green;
and the trait value for the parasite u2 is cyan.
at the lowest population of the host. These simulation results suggest that the ability of the host and
parasite to adapt, as measured by the variance of the trait differences in the parasitism efficiency a, can
alter the community dynamics of natural systems, leading to novel dynamics including antiphase and
cryptic cycles. Such cycles, induced by the variance of the trait difference measured in the parasitism
efficiency a, could be another potential signature of host-parasite co-evolution and reveal that host-
parasite co-evolution can shape, and possibly reverse, community dynamics. These results offer another
perspective on the recent work by Cortez and Weitza (2014), which uses an eco-co-evolutionary model
to show that predator-prey co-evolution can drive population cycles where the opposite of canonical
Lotka-Volterra oscillations occurs; predator peaks precede prey peaks.
5. Conclusion
Host-parasite co-evolution, or the reciprocal evolution of host defenses and parasite counter-strategies,
can affect a range of ecological and evolutionary processes (Thompson 2005; Go´mez et al. 2014), from pop-
ulation dynamics (Yoshida et al. 2003), to the maintenance of genetic variation (Clark et al 2007). Despite
this, there are relatively few mathematical models examining the co-evolution of quantitative traits in hosts
and parasites (Best et al 2009). Although most models assume that the parasite is obligate, cases of facul-
tative and/or generalist parasites are common and ecologically significant (Spottiswoode et al 2012).
In this paper, we have presented a co-evolutionary model of a social parasite-host system that includes (1)
ecological dynamics that feed back into the co-evolutionary outcomes; (2) consideration of both obligate and
facultative parasitic strategies; and (3) Holling Type II functional responses between the host and parasite.
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Figure 8: The oscillating dynamics when σa is small. The dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) when σK1 = σK2 = K01 =
r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4, σa = 0.15 with initial values (x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) =
(0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for the host u1 is green; and the trait value for the
parasite u2 is cyan.
The analytical study on the proposed model provides insightful information on the impacts of host-parasite
co-evolution on varied ecological and evolutionary processes. Here we summarize our main results as follows.
Recall that d is the death rate of a parasite due to searching/hunting for all potential hosts, and r2 ≥ 0
is the intrinsic growth rate of the parasite without parasitizing a given host x2. If d > r2, the parasite is
obligate; and if d < r2, the parasite is facultative. In the absence of evolution, we performed local and global
analyses to investigate the ecological outcomes when parasites range from facultative to obligate.
When we fix other parameters and let d vary, our proposed ecological model can exhibit a wide range of
dynamics illustrating how ecological dynamics change when the parasite makes the transition from faculta-
tive to obligate. The typical dynamics are shown Figure 1-2. As an example displayed in Figure 2, we can
see that: when d is extremely small, the host goes extinct globally; when d is small, the system can exhibit
bi-stability between the parasite-only boundary equilibrium and the coexistence interior attractor; when d
is in the intermediate range of values, the system is permanent and can process three interior equilibria that
lead to two distinct coexistence attractors; when d is large, the system is permanent with only one coexis-
tence attractor; however, when d is extremely large, the parasite goes extinct, resulting in global stability of
the host-only boundary equilibrium. More specifically, our analytical results imply that:
1. Facultative parasitism can drive the host extinct locally (Proposition 3.1) or globally (Theorem 3.3),
while obligate parasitism can only generate global extinction of parasites (Proposition 3.1 and Theorem
3.3).
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Figure 9: The larger oscillating dynamics when σa is smaller. The dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) when
σK1 = σK2 = K01 = r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4, σa = 0.05 with initial values
(x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue; the trait value for host u1 is green; and
the trait value for parasite u2 is cyan.
2. When the parasite is obligate, i.e., d > r2, the host always persists. However, when the parasite is
facultative, i.e., d < r2, the host can go to extinction under certain conditions, while the facultative
parasite always persists (see Theorem 3.1).
3. The host-facultative parasite model can have rich dynamics that process one, two, and three interior
equilibria with consequences of two or three attractors; the host-obligate parasite model can have either
one or three interior equilibria (Theorem 3.2). When the system has two interior equilibria (only for
the facultative parasite) the system has a parasite-only boundary attractor and a coexistence interior
attractor; when the system has three interior equilibria the system has two distinct coexistence interior
attractors.
Host-parasite co-evolution plays an essential role in both ecological and evolutionary processes. Our
work on the co-evolutionary dynamics confirms this, and addresses the importance of trait function effects
on evolutionary outcomes. More specifically, our main findings are:
1. When the death rate d of the parasite depends on its trait value, under proper trait functions (Theorem
4.1), the parasite can choose different strategies such that it can be facultative at some trait values
while it is obligate at others. However, these strategies are not ESS (see Figure 3-4). A potential bio-
logical example supporting these results may be slave-making ants in the Formica sanguinea complex.
These species display the ability to vary behaviorally between reliance on parasitism of other ants, and
producing their own worker offspring. They have been suggested to represent an intermediate parasitic
27
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
t
x
1/x
2/u
1/u
2
 
 
x1
x2
u1
u2
σ
a
=0.005
Figure 10: The oscillating dynamics converge to the stable interior equilibrium is (0.5428, 1.0841, 0, 0) when σa = 0.005. The
dynamics of the co-evolutionary model (5) when σK1 = σK2 = K01 = r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e =
0.9, h = 4, σa = 0.05 with initial value (x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1): the host x1 is red; the parasite x2 is blue;
the trait value for host u1 is green; and the trait value for parasite u2 is cyan.
stage, between those species without predominant brood raiding, and obligate slave-making species
(Topoff and Zimmerli 1991; Ruano et al. 2013).
2. When the death rate d of the parasite is independent of its trait value, Corollary 4.1 implies that
the host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2 can have ESS when the parasite is obligate; and the facultative
parasite-only equilibrium E0x2u1u2 can also have ESS.
3. Let the death rate d of the parasite be independent of its trait value, and other trait functions follow
normal distributions. Our results (Theorem 4.3 and its corollary 4.2; Theorem 4.4) show that: (1)
co-evolution can save the host from extinction by destabilizing the facultative-parasite only boundary
equilibrium and generating a new locally stable coexistence interior equilibrium (see Theorem 4.2 and
Figure 5-10); (2) the variances of the proposed trait functions, i.e., σK1 , σK2 and σd, play essential roles
in guaranteeing the local stable interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) having ESS; (3) when the parasite
death rate d is large, the host can have ESS that drive the parasite extinct globally; and (4) Large
variances of the parasite carrying capacity σK2 and of the parasitism efficiency σa are required to make
sure of (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) being ESS. In addition, we have following interesting results:
(a) It is possible to have locally stable coexistence interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) with u
∗
1, u
∗
2 > 0
(see Proposition (4.1) and Figure 5-6) but these strategies may not be ESS. This can occur when
the ecological system has two interior equilibria with the facultative parasite-only equilibrium
being locally stable; and co-evolution destabilizes this facultative-parasite-only boundary equilib-
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rium and generates a new locally stable coexistence interior equilibrium .
(b) The variance of the trait difference in parasitism efficiency has huge impacts on the population
dynamics. More specifically, small values of the variance σa can destabilize the system, thus
generate evolutionary arms-race dynamics with different host-parasite fluctuating patterns (see
Figure 5 - 11).
Our theoretical work on the ecological and co-evolutionary dynamics of the host-parasite system show
interesting matches with recent ecological considerations of social parasitism (Foitzik et al. 2001 & 2003;
reviewed by Kruger 2007; Davies 2011; Kilner and Langmore 2011) in the following ways:
1. The study in Section 4.1 of the host-only equilibrium suggests that the host-only equilibrium Ex10u1u2
of the co-evolutionary model (5) can have two ESS (u∗1, u
∗
2) = (0, c) and (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = (c, 0) when the
parasite is obligate (i.e., d > r2). This can be classified as one of the co-evolutionary outcomes when
the host successfully resists invasion by the parasite, and when resistance is due to effective front-line
defenses (Foitzik et al. 2001 & 2003; reviewed by Kruger 2007; Davies 2011; Kilner and Langmore
2011).
2. The results in Theorem 4.2, Theorem 4.3 and its corollary 4.2 imply that large variances of the parasite
carrying capacity σK2 and of parasitism efficiency σa are required to make sure of the strategy (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) =
(0, 0) of (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) being an ESS but it may not be a global ESS, because of the possibility that the
system has other ESS for coexistence. This can be considered as equivalent to a tolerance of the parasite
co-evolutionary outcome where hosts to some degree concede to the parasite, and accept it into their
nests, but also make adjustments to their life history (or other traits) to minimize the negative effects
of parasitism on their fitness (Foitzik et al. 2001 & 2003; reviewed by Kruger 2007; Davies 2011; Kilner
and Langmore 2011). This co-evolutionary outcome is more likely to be the case that parasitic control
of the co-evolutionary trajectory.
3. Theorem 4.4: A large death rate due to the parasite overhunting/attacking the host can lead to the
extinction of the parasite, and lead to a successful resistance by hosts evolutionary outcome (Foitzik
et al. 2001 & 2003; reviewed by Kruger 2007; Davies 2011; Kilner and Langmore 2011).
4. Theorem 4.4: when the ratio of the variance of the parasite to the host is larger than 1, i.e.,
σK2
σK1
> 1,
small values of a0 can lead to the interior equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) being the only equilibrium that has
ESS in the co-evolutionary model (13). This type co-evolutionary outcome is referred to as acceptance
of the parasite. It can become an adaptive strategy for hosts when the costs of rearing a parasite are,
on average, lower than the costs of recognition and rejection (Foitzik et al. 2001 & 2003; reviewed by
Kruger 2007; Davies 2011; Kilner and Langmore 2011).
6. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Both sets X1 and X2 are invariant for the ecological model (6) since we have
dx1
dt
∣∣
x1=0
=
dx2
dt
∣∣
x2=0
= 0.
The continuity of the expressions of both dx1dt and
dx2
dt implies that Model (6) is positively invariant in X .
29
LetKM1 = supu1∈R{K1(u1)} andKM2 = supu2∈R{K2(u2)}. From (6) and its positively invariant property
in X , we have the following two inequalities
dx1
dt = x1
[
r1(1− x1K1 )− ax21+hax1
]
≤ r1x1(1 − x1K1 ) ≤ r1x1(1− x1KM1 )
dx2
dt = x2
[
eax1
1+hax1
− d+ r2(1− x2K2 )
]
≤ ex2h + r2x2(1− x2KM2 ) = (r2 +
e
h )x2
(
1− x2
KM
2
(r2+
e
h
)
r2
)
≤ (r2 + eh )x2
(
1− x2
KM
2
(r2+
e
h
)
r2
)
which implies that
lim sup
t→∞
x1(t) ≤ KM1 and lim sup
t→∞
x2(t) ≤
KM2 (r2 +
e
h)
r2
.
Therefore, the statement of Lemma 3.1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of the ecological model (6) evaluated at its equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) can be repre-
sented as follows:
J(x∗1,x∗2) =

 r1(1− x∗1K1 )− ax∗21+hax∗1 + x∗1
(
− r1x∗1K1 +
eax∗2
(1+ahx∗1)
2
)
− ax∗11+hax∗1
eax∗2
(1+ahx∗1)
2 r2(1− x
∗
2
K2
+
eax∗2
1+hax∗1
)− d− r2x∗2K2

 . (21)
Therefore, we can have the following three cases:
1. The eigenvalues of the extinction equilibrium E00 are λ1 = r1 and λ2 = r2 − d. Thus, E00 is a source
if r2 > d while it is a saddle if r2 < d.
2. The eigenvalues of E10 are λ1 = −r1 and λ2 = r2− d+ eaK11+ahK1 . Thus, E10 is a sink if r2+ eaK11+ahK1 < d
while it is a saddle if r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
> d.
3. The equilibrium E01 exists if r2 > d. In this case, E00 is a source and E10 is a saddle. The eigenvalues
of E01 are λ1 = r1 +
adK2
r2
− aK2 and λ2 = d − r2 < 0. Therefore, E01 is a sink if r1 + adK2r2 < aK2
(i.e., r1aK1 < 1− dr2 ) while it is a saddle if r1 + adK2r2 > aK2 (i.e., r1aK1 > 1− dr2 ).
Thus, the statement of Proposition 3.1 holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. According to Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, we can conclude that (i) Model (6) is positively invariant
in both X1 and X2; (ii) the omega limit set of X1 is E10; and (iii) the omega limit set of X2 is E00 if r2 < d
while the omega limit set of X2 is E01 if r2 > d.
The results (Theorem 2.5 and its corollary) in Hutson (1984) guarantee that the persistence of the host
x1 is determined by the sign of
dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
X1
=


dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
E00
if r2 < d
dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
E01
if r2 > d

 .
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And the persistence of the parasite x2 is determined by the sign of
dx2
x2dt
∣∣∣
X1
=
dx2
x2dt
∣∣∣
E10
.
Therefore, we can conclude the following:
1. The prey x1 is persistent in X if the following inequality holds
dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
X2
=
dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
E10
=


dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
E00
= r1 > 0 if r2 < d
dx1
x1dt
∣∣∣
E01
= r1 − a(1− dr2 )K2 > 0 if r2 > d

 (22)
This implies that x1 is persistent if r2 < d or
r1
aK2
> 1− dr2 > 0.
2. The predator x2 is persistent in X if the following inequality holds
dx2
x2dt
∣∣∣
X1
=
dx2
x2dt
∣∣∣
E10
= r2 − d+ eaK1
1 + haK1
> 0 (23)
This implies that x2 is persistent if r2 +
eaK1
1+haK1
> d.
3. The discussions of two items above imply that Model (6) is permanent (i.e., both prey x1 and predator
x2 are persistent in X) if either
r1
aK2
> 1− d
r2
> 0
or
r2 +
eaK1
1 + haK1
> d > r2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) of Model (6) satisfies the following two equations:
r1(1− x1K1 ) =
ax2
1+hax1
⇔ x2 = f(x1) = r1(K1−x1)(1+ahx1)aK1 subject to 0 < x1 < K1
eax1
1+hax1
= d− r2(1− x2K2 )⇔ x2 = g(x1) =
K2
r2
[
eax1
1+hax1
+ (r2 − d)
]
subject to 1a( e
d−r2
−h) < x1 and d < r2 +
eaK1
1+haK1
(24)
which implies that there is no interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) if d > r2 +
eaK1
1+haK1
. The equations (24) imply
that x∗1 is a root of fg(x1) = g(x1)− f(x1):
fg(x1) =
c3x
3
1 + c2x
2
1 + c1x1 + c0
ar2K1(1 + ahx1)
=
F (x1)
ar2K1(1 + ahx1)
where
c3 = r1r2(ah)
2 c2 = ahr1r2(2− ahK1)
c1 = a
2hK1K2
(
r2 +
e
h − d
)
+ r1r2(1− 2ahK1) c0 = ar2K1
[
K2
(
1− dr2
)
− r1a
]
We classify interior equilibria for Model (6) in the following cases:
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1. If c0 > 0⇔ K2
(
1− dr2
)
− r1a > 0⇔ r1aK2 < 1− dr2 (i.e., sufficient conditions for the locally asymptotical
stability of E01 according to Proposition 3.1) , then we can conclude that F (x1) has either no interior
equilibrium or two interior equilibria since c3 > 0. This implies that Model (6) may have either no
interior equilibrium or two interior equilibria when c0 > 0 (i.e., E01 is locally asymptotically stable).
2. If c0 < 0⇔ r1aK2 > 1− dr2 (i.e., E01 is a saddle according to Proposition 3.1), by using similar arguments
for the case of c0 > 0, then we can conclude that Model (6) may have either one interior equilibrium
or three interior equilibria when c0 < 0.
3. Note that
F ′(x1) = 3c3x
2
1 + 2c2x1 + c1 = 3c3
(
x1 +
c2
3c3
)2
+ c1 − c
2
2
3c3
= 3c3
(
x1 − ahK1−23ah
)2
+ a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
− r1r2(ahK1+1)23
.
Thus, we have the following two scenarios:
(a) If a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 (i.e., c1 <
c22
3c3
), then F ′(x1) = 0 has two real roots
x1c =
−c2 −
√
c22 − 3c1c3
3c3
< x2c =
−c2 +
√
c22 − 3c1c3
3c3
.
In this case, we can conclude that F (x1) has three positive roots if
c0 < 0, x
1
c > 0, F (x
1
c) > 0 and F (x
2
c) < 0.
The equation F (x1) has one positive roots if
c0 < 0, and F (x
2
c) < 0.
The equation F (x1) has two positive roots if
c0 > 0, x
2
c > 0, and F (x
2
c) < 0.
(b) If a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 (i.e., c1 >
c22
3c3
), then F ′(x1) > 0 which indicates that
F (x1) is an increasing function of x1. Therefore, F (x1) has one positive root if c0 < 0 and has no
positive roots if c0 > 0.
4. Now we discuss that the cases when Model (6) has either no interior equilibrium or one interior
equilibrium in terms of the function f(x1) and g(x1). First, we know that (1) The function f(x1) is
a degree two polynomial with two roots − 1ah and K1. (2) f(x1) is a decreasing function whenever
x1 >
K1−1/ah
2 while g(x1) is an increasing function with a unique positive root x
∗ = d−r2a[e−h(d−r2)] when
r2 < d < r2 +
e
h . Therefore, the functions f(x1) and g(x1) have no intercept for x1 > 0 if
d− r2
a[e− h(d− r2)] > K1 ⇔ d > r2 +
eaK1
1 + ahK1
.
This also implies that when r2 < d < r2 +
e
h we have the following sufficient condition for f(x1) and
g(x1) having a unique positive intercept:
d− r2
a[e− h(d− r2)] < K1 ⇔ r2 < d < r2 +
eaK1
1 + ahK1
.
If r2 > d, then the functions f(x1) and g(x1) have no intercept for x1 > 0 in the following two cases:
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(a) K1−1/ah2 < 0 and g(0) > f(0)⇔ K2
(
1− dr2
)
> r1a .
(b) K1−1/ah2 > 0 and g(0) > f(
K−1/ah
2 )⇔ K2
(
1− dr2
)
>
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2hK1
.
Now assume that K1 <
1
ah , then f(x1) is a decreasing function while g(x1) is an increasing function
for x1 > 0. Thus the functions f(x1) and g(x1) have an unique interior intercept for x1 > 0 in the
following two cases:
(a) r2 > d and g(0) < f(0)⇔ 0 < K2
(
1− dr2
)
< r1a .
(b) r2 < d < r2 +
e
h and 0 < x
∗ = d−r2a[e−h(d−r2)] < K1 where g(x
∗) = 0.
The discussions above lead to the following summary regarding the interior equilibria of Model (6) which is
also listed in Table 2:
1. Model (6) has no interior equilibrium if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) d > r2 +
aeK1
ahK1+1
; or
(b) r1aK2 < 1− dr2 and a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 ; or
(c) K1 <
1
ah and
r1
aK2
< 1− dr2 ; or
(d) K1 >
1
ah and
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2hK1K2
< 1− dr2 .
2. Model (6) has an unique interior equilibrium if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) r2 < d < r2 +
aeK1
ahK1+1
; or
(b) r1aK2 > 1− dr2 and
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
; or
(c) r1aK2 > 1− dr2 ,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
and F (x2c) < 0.
3. Model (6) has two interior equilibria if r1aK2 < 1− dr2 ,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
and F (x2c) < 0 with
x2c > 0.
4. Model (6) has three interior equilibria if r1aK2 > 1 − dr2 ,
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
<
r1(ahK1+1)
2
3a2K1K2
, F (x1c) > 0, and
F (x2c) < 0 with x
1
c > 0.
where x1c =
c2
3c3
−
√
c1 − c
2
2
3c3
< x2c =
c2
3c3
+
√
c1 − c
2
2
3c3
.
Let (x∗1, x
∗
2) be an interior equilibrium of Model (6), then its stability is determined by the eigenvalues of
the following Jacobian matrix
J i(x∗1,x∗2)
=

 x∗1
(
− r1K1 +
eax∗2
(1+ahx∗1)
2
)
− ax∗11+hax∗1
eax∗2
(1+ahx∗1)
2 − r2x
∗
2
K2

 . (25)
whose eigenvalues λi, i = 1, 2 satisfy the following equalities:
λ1 + λ2 = −r1x
∗
1
K1
− r2x
∗
2
K2
+
ha2x∗1x
∗
2
(1 + ahx∗1)
2
< −r1x
∗
1
K1
− r2x
∗
2
K2
+
ax∗2
2
and
λ1λ2 = x
∗
1x
∗
2
[
r1r2
K1K2
+
ea2
(1 + ahx∗1)
3
− r2a
2hx∗2
(1 + ahx∗1)
2
]
≥ x∗1x∗2
[
r1r2
K1K2
+
ea2
(1 + ahK1)3
− a2hK2(r2 + e
h
)
]
.
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This implies that the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) is locally asymptotically stable if
r2
K2
>
a
2
and
r1r2
K1K2
+
ea2
(1 + ahK1)3
> a2hK2(r2 +
e
h
).
Therefore, the statement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. The proof of the global stability of E01 is similar to the proof of the global stability of E10, thus we
only focus on the case of E01.
According to Proposition 3.1, we know that Model (6) has only three boundary equilibria E00, E10 and
E01 where E00 is always a saddle; E10 is locally asymptotically stable when the inequality d > r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
hold while it is unstable if d > r2 +
eaK1
1+ahK1
; and E01 is locally asymptotically stable when the inequality
r1
aK2
< 1 − dr2 hold while it is unstable if
r1
aK2
> 1 − dr2 . Proposition 3.1 also implies that if E10 is locally
asymptotically stable then E01 is unstable while E01 is locally asymptotically stable then E10 is unstable.
Now assume that r1aK2 < 1− dr2 and one of the following conditions is satisfied
1. a2r2K1K2
(
h+ dr2 − er2
)
>
r1r2(ahK1+1)
2
3 ; or
2. K1 <
1
ah ; or
3. K1 >
1
ah and
r1(1+ahK1)
2
4a2hK1K2
< 1− dr2 .
Then according to the proof of Theorem 3.2, Model (6) has only three boundary equilibria E00, E10 and E01
where both E00, E10 are unstable and E01 is locally asymptotically stable.
According to Lemma 3.1, Model (6) has a compact global attractor. Thus, from an application of the
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem (Guckenheimer and Holmes 1983 [39]) we conclude that the trajectory starting
at any initial condition living in the interior of R2+ converges to one of the three boundary equilibria E00, E10
since Model (6) has no interior equilibrium under the condition. Since E01 is the only locally asymptotically
stable boundary equilibrium, therefore, every trajectory of Model (6) converges to E01 for any initial condition
taken in the interior of R2+. This implies that E01 is global stable. Therefore, our statement holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let
av =
∂a(u, v)
∂v
, au =
∂a(u, v)
∂u
, avv =
∂2a(u, v)
∂v2
, auu =
∂2a(u, v)
∂u2
, and auv =
∂2a(u, v)
∂v∂u
=
∂2a(u, v)
∂u∂v
.
Now we are exploring the local stability of Ex10uv = (K1(u), 0, u, v) and E0x2uv =
(
0,K2(v)
(
1− d(v)r2
)
, u, v
)
where u, v are the trait values that satisfy the following two equations:
r1x1K
′
1(u)
K21 (u)
=
x2
∂a(u,v)
∂u
(1+ha(u,v)x1)2
= x2au(u,v)(1+ha(u,v)x1)2
d′(v) = ex1av(u,v)(1+ha(u,v)x1)2 +
r2x2K
′
2(v)
K22 (v)
.
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Therefore, at the equilibrium Ex10uv = (K1(u), 0, u, v), we have
K ′1(u) = 0 and d
′(v) =
eK1(u)av(u, v)
(1 + ha(u, v)K1(u))2
with the following Jacobian matrix
J(K1(u),0,u,v) =


−r1 − K1(u)a(u,v)1+ha(u,v)K1(u) 0 0
0 ea(u,v)K1(u)1+ha(u,v)K1(u) − d(v) + r2 0 0
0 − σ21au(u,v)(1+ha(u,v)K1(u))2
σ21r1K
′′
1 (u)
K1(u)
0
σ22eav(u,v)(1−ha(u,v)K1(u))
(1+ha(u,v)K1(u))3
σ22r2K
′
2(v)
K22(v)
b21 b22

 (26)
with
b21 =
σ22eK1(u) [auv(u, v)(1 + haK1(u))− 2K1(u)au(u, v)av(u, v)]
(1 + ha(u, v)K1(u))3
and
b22 =
σ22eK1(u)
[
avv(u, v)(1 + haK1(u))− 2K1(u)a2v(u, v)
]
(1 + ha(u, v)K1(u))3
− σ22d′′(v).
The eigenvalues of (26) are
−r1, ea(u, v)K1(u)
1 + ha(u, v)K1(u)
−d(v)+r2, σ
2
1r1K
′′
1 (u)
K1(u)
,
σ22eK1(u)
[
avv(u, v)(1 + haK1(u))− 2K1(u)a2v(u, v)
]
(1 + ha(u, v)K1(u))3
−σ22d′′(v).
This implies that if the equilibrium Ex10uv = (K1(u), 0, u, v) exists, then it is locally asymptotically stable if
0 <
ea(u, v)K1(u)
1 + ha(u, v)K1(u)
< d(v)−r2, K ′′1 (u) < 0, and
eK1(u)
[
avv(u, v)(1 + haK1(u))− 2K1(u)a2v(u, v)
]
(1 + ha(u, v)K1(u))3
< d′′(v).
Similarly, if the equalities au(u, v) = 0, d(v) < r2 and d
′(v) =
r2K
′
2(v)
K2(v)
hold, then the equilibrium E0x2uv =(
0,K2(v)
(
1− d(v)r2
)
, u, v
)
exists with the following Jacobian matrix
J(0,K2(v),u,v) =


r1 − a(u, v)K2(v)
(
1− d(v)r2
)
0 0 0
ea(u, v)K2(v)
(
1− d(v)r2
)
d(v)− r2 0 0
σ21r1K
′
1(u)
K21(u)
0 −σ21K2(v)
(
1− d(v)r2
)
auu(u, v) b12
σ22eav(u, v)
σ22r2
(
1− d(v)
r2
)
K′2(v)
K2(v)
0 b22


(27)
where
b12 = −σ21K2(v)
(
1− d(v)
r2
)
auv(u, v)
and
b22 =
σ22r2
(
1− d(v)r2
) [
K2(v)K
′′
2 (v)− 2(K ′2(v))2
]
K2(v)2
− σ22d′′(v).
The eigenvalues of (27) are
r1 − a(u, v)K2(v)
(
1− d(v)
r2
)
, −d(v) + r2, −σ21K2(v)
(
1− d(v)
r2
)
auu(u, v),
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and
σ22r2
(
1− d(v)r2
) [
K2(v)K
′′
2 (v)− 2(K ′2(v))2
]
K2(v)2
− σ22d′′(v).
This implies that the facultative-social-parasite-only equilibrium E0x2uv = (0,K2(v), u, v) exists and it is
locally asymptotically stable if the following inequalities hold
r1
1− d(v)r2
< a(u, v)K2(v), r2 < d(v), auu(u, v) > 0, and
r2
(
1− d(v)r2
) [
K2(v)K
′′
2 (v)− 2(K ′2(v))2
]
K2(v)2
< d′′(v).
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. First, we can check that the boundary equilibrium of (13) can occur only if u∗1 = u
∗
2 = 0. According
to Proposition 3.1, the boundary equilibria are:
E0000 = (0, 0, 0, 0), Ex1000 = (K01, 0, 0, 0), and E0x200 =
(
0,K02
(
1− d
r2
)
, 0, 0
)
provided that r2 > d.
When u∗1 = u
∗
2 = 0, the Jacobian matrix evaluated at an equilibrium (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) can be represented as
follows:
J(x∗1,x
∗
2,0,0)
=


a11 a12 0 0
a21 a22 0 0
0 0 b11 b12
0 0 b21 b22

 (28)
whose eigenvalues are determined by the eigenvalues of matirices A and B
A =
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
=

 x∗1
(
− r1K01 +
ea0x
∗
2
(1+a0hx∗1)
2
)
+
(
r1(1− x
∗
1
K01
)− a0x∗21+a0hx∗1
)
− a0x∗11+ha0x∗1
ea0x
∗
2
(1+a0hx∗1)
2 − r2x
∗
2
K02
+ r2(1− x
∗
2
K02
) +
ea0x
∗
1
1+a0hx∗1
− d


(29)
and
B =
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
]
=


σ21
(
− r1x∗1
σ2
K1
K01
+
a0x
∗
2
σ2a(1+a0hx
∗
1)
2
)
− σ21a0x∗2σ2a(1+a0hx∗1)2
σ22ea0x
∗
1
σ2a(1+a0hx
∗
1)
2 −σ22
(
r2x
∗
2
σ2
K2
K02
+
a0ex
∗
1
σ2a(1+a0hx
∗
1)
2
)

 . (30)
Therefore, we can conclude the following cases:
1. E0000: In this case, the eigenvalues of A are r1 and r2 − d while the eigenvalues of B are zeros. Thus,
E0000 is always a saddle.
2. Ex1000 = (K01, 0, 0, 0): In this case, the eigenvalues of A are −r1 and r2 − d + ea0K011+ahK01 while the
eigenvalues of B are − r1σ21
σ2
K1
and − σ22ea0K01σ2a(1+a0hK01)2 . Thus, Ex1000 is locally asymptotically stable if r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
< d (i.e., E10 is locally asymptotically stable for the ecological model (6)) and Ex1000 is a
saddle if r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
> d.
3. E0x200 = (0,K02
(
1− dr2
)
, 0, 0) exists if r2 > d: In this case, the eigenvalues of A are r1+
a0dK02
r2
−a0K02
and d−r2 while the eigenvalues of B are −σ
2
1K02a0(d−r2)
σ2ar2
and
σ22(d−r2)
σ2
K2
. Thus, E0x200 is always a saddle.
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4. When u∗1 = u
∗
2 = 0, the existence conditions regarding interior equilibria (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) of the evolu-
tionary model (13) are the same as interior equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2) of the ecological model (6) by letting
K1 = K01, K2 = K02 and a = a0. Thus, according to Theorem 3.2, Model (13) can have one, two, or
three interior equilibria (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) depending on the values of ri, d, h, e, a0 and K0i where i = 1, 2.
Sufficient condition of an interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) being locally asymptotically stable is that
both matrices A and B have negative eigenvalues.
According to Theorem 3.2, the eigenvalues of A are negative if inequalities (7) hold, i.e.,
r2
K02
>
a0
2
and
r1r2
K01K02
+
ea20
(1 + a0hK01)3
> a20hK02(r2 +
e
h
).
Let λ1 and λ2 be eigenvalues of B. Then we have as follows:
λ1 + λ2 = − r1σ
2
1x
∗
1
K01σ2K1
− r2σ22x∗2
K02σ2K2
+
a0(σ
2
1x
∗
1−eσ
2
2x
∗
2)
(1+a0hx∗1)
2
< −
(
r1
K01σ2K1
− a0
)
σ21x
∗
1 − r2σ
2
2x
∗
2
K02σ2K2
− a0eσ22x∗2(1+a0hx∗1)2
and
λ1λ2 = σ
2
1σ
2
2
[
r1r2x
∗
1x
∗
2
K01K02
+
a0r1e(x
∗
1)
2
σ2
K1
K01σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2 − a0r2(x
∗
2)
2
σ2
K2
K02σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2
]
= σ21σ
2
2

 r1r2x∗1x∗2K01K02 +
a0
(
r1e(x
∗
1)
2
σ2
K1
K01
−
r2(x
∗
2)
2
σ2
K2
K02
)
σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2


> σ21σ
2
2
[
r1r2x
∗
1x
∗
2
K01K02
+
a0r1e(x
∗
1)
2
σ2
K1
K01σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2 − a0r2(x
∗
2)
2
σ2
K2
K02σ2a
]
= σ21σ
2
2
[
r1r2x
∗
1x
∗
2
K01K02
− a0r2(x∗2)2
σ2
K2
K02σ2a
+
a0r1e(x
∗
1)
2
σ2
K1
K01σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2
]
= σ21σ
2
2
[
r2x
∗
2
K02
(
r1x
∗
1
K01
− a0x∗2
σ2
K2
σ2a
)
+
a0r1e(x
∗
1)
2
σ2
K1
K01σ2a(1+ahx
∗
1)
2
]
Therefore, we can conclude that if r1
K01σ2K1
> a0 and one of the following two inequalities hold
r1x
∗
1
K01
>
a0x
∗
2
σ2
K2
σ2a
⇔ r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
>
x∗2
x∗1
or
r1eσ
2
K2
K02
r2σ2K1
K01
>
(x∗2)
2
(x∗1)
2 ⇔ σ
2
K2
σ2
K1
r1eK02
r2K01
>
(x∗2)
2
(x∗1)
2
, (31)
then we have λ1 + λ2 < 0 and λ1λ2 > 0, which implies that B has two negative eigenvalues. Thus, we
can conclude that if the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) exists, then it is locally asymptotical stable
if one of the two inequalities in (31) holds and the following inequalities hold:
min
{ 2r2
K02
,
r1
σ2K1K01
}
> a0 and
r1r2
K01K02
+
ea20
(1 + a0hK01)3
> a20hK02(r2 +
e
h
).
Therefore, the statement of Theorem 4.2 holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. According to the definition of ESS, Ex1000 is an ESS if it is an ESE and it satisfies the ESS maximum
principle (2). According to Theorem 4.2, Ex1000 is an ESE if the inequality r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
< d holds. Notice
that
maxv1∈R{G1(v1, 0, 0,K01, 0)} = maxv1∈R
{
r1
(
1− K01K1(v1)
)}
= r1
(
1− K01K1(v1)
) ∣∣∣
v1=0
= G1(0, 0, 0,K01, 0) = 0
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and
maxv2∈R{G2(v2, 0, 0,K01, 0)} = maxv2∈R
{
e a(0,v2)K01
1+ha(0,v2)K01
− d+ r2
}
= e a(0,v2)K011+ha(0,v2)K01 − d+ r2
∣∣∣
v2=0
= G2(0, 0, 0,K01, 0) < 0
.
Therefore, Ex1000 is an ESS whenever the inequality r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
< d holds.
Similarly, the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESS if it is an ESE and it satisfies the ESS maximum
principle (2). According to Theorem 4.2, (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESE if the inequalities (18) hold. Notice that
Ki(v), a(0, v), a(v, 0), i = 1, 2 are decreasing functions with respect to |v|, and the following equations
G2(v2, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
e a(0,v2)x
∗
1
1+h a(0,v2)x∗1
− d+ r2
(
1− x∗2K2(v2)
)
∂G2(v2,0,0,x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂v2
= −v2σ22
[
r2x
∗
2
σ2
K2
K2(v2)
+
ex∗1a(0,v2)
σ2a(1+ha(0,v2)x
∗
1)
2
]
.
Therefore, we can conclude that
maxv2∈R{G2(v2, 0, 0, x∗1, x∗2)} = maxv2∈R
{
e a(0,v2)x
∗
1
1+ha(0,v2)x∗1
− d+ r2
(
1− x∗2K2(v2)
)}
=
e a0x
∗
1
1+ha0x∗1
− d+ r2
(
1− x∗2K02
)
= G2(0, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = 0
.
On the other hand, we have
G1(v1, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = r1
(
1− x∗1K1(v1)
)
− a(v1,0)x∗21+ha(v1,0)x∗1
∂G1(v1,0,0,x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂v1
= σ21v1
[
− r1x∗1
σ2
K1
K1(v1)
+
x∗2a(v1,0)
σ2a(1+ha(v1,0)x
∗
1)
2
]
.
Since the inequalities (18) hold, then we have
− r1x∗1
σ2
K1
K1(v1)
+
x∗2a(v1,0)
σ2a(1+ha(v1,0)x
∗
1)
2 ≤ − r1x
∗
1
σ2
K1
K1(v1)
+
x∗1 max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
a(v1,0)
σ2a(1+ha(v1,0)x
∗
1)
2
≤ x∗1

− r1
σ2
K1
K01
+
max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
a0
σ2a

 .
This implies that if r1
σ2
K1
K01
>
max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
a0
σ2a
, then we have
∂G1(v1, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
∂v1
< 0 if v1 > 0;
∂G1(v1, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2)
∂v1
> 0 if v1 < 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that
maxv1∈R{G1(v1, 0, 0, x∗1, x∗2)} = maxv1∈R
{
r1
(
1− x∗1K1(v1)
)
− a(v1,0)x∗21+h a(v1,0)x∗1
}
= G1(0, 0, 0, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = 0
if the following inequality holds
r1
σ2K1K01
>
max
{
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
,
r1σ
2
K2
σ2a
a0K01
}
a0
σ2a
.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. According to Theorem 4.3, we know that the boundary equilibrium Ex1000 is an ESS of the co-
evolutionary host-parasite model (13) whenever the inequality r2+
ea0K01
1+a0hK01
< d holds. Under this condition,
Model (13) has only two boundary equilibria E0000 and Ex1000 where E0000 is always a saddle.
According to Lemma 3.1, we know that lim supt→∞ x1(t) ≤ K01. Since a(u1, u2) ≤ a0 and the function
ea(u1,u2)x1
1+ha(u1,u2)x1
increases with respect to ax1, thus for time large enough, we have
dx2
x2dt
=
ea(u1, u2)x1
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
− d+ r2(1− x2
K2(u2)
) ≤ ea0K01
1 + a0hK01
− d+ r2 < 0.
This implies that Model (13) has no interior equilibrium. Therefore, when the inequality r2 +
ea0K01
1+ahK01
< d
holds, Model (13) has only a unique ESE Ex1000 which is also an ESS.
If K02a0 <
r1
1− d
r2
and K01a0 <
1
h holds, then for any given trait u = (u1, u2), we have K2a <
r1
1− d
r2
.
According to Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, the ecological model (6) has a unique interior equilibrium
(x∗1, x
∗
2) and three boundary equilibria E00, E10, E01. Thus the evolutionary model (13) has at least one
interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) and three boundary equilibria E0000, Ex1000, E0x200 which are all saddles.
According to Theorem 4.3, the interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is an ESS if (20) holds.
Now we should show that the evolutionary model (13) has no interior equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) with
u∗1u
∗
2 > 0 when (20) holds. Assume that this is not true, then let (x
∗
1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) be the interior equilibrium,
then it satisfies the equations(16) and (17) which gives the following equality:
r1x
∗
1u
∗
1σ
2
K2
K2(u
∗
2)
r2x
∗
2u
∗
2σ
2
K1
K1(u∗1)
=
x2
ex1
⇔ x∗2 =
√
er1σ
2
K2
u∗1K2(u
∗
2)
r2σ
2
K1
u∗2K1(u
∗
1)
x∗1 =
σK2
σK1
√√√√√er1u∗1K02e−
(u∗
2
)2
2σ2
K2
+
(u∗
1
)2
2σ2
K1
r2u
∗
2K01
x∗1. (32)
In addition, the equations(16) and (17) requires u∗1, u
∗
2 and u
∗
1 − u∗2 having the same sign. This implies that
|u∗1| > |u∗2|. Thus, according to (32), if σK2 > σK1 , then we have
x∗2 =
σK2
σK1
√√√√√er1u∗1K02e−
(u∗
2
)2
2σ2
K2
+
(u∗
1
)2
2σ2
K1
r2u
∗
2K01
x∗1 >
σK2
σK1
√√√√er1K02e−
(u∗
2
)2
2σ2
K2
+
(u∗
2
)2
2σ2
K1
r2K01
x∗1 >
σK2
σK1
√
er1K02
r2K01
x∗1.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that
σK2
σK1
√
r1eK02
r2K01
>
x∗2
x∗1
in (20). Thus, Model (13) has no interior
equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) with u
∗
1u
∗
2 > 0 when (20) holds. This indicates that the interior equilibrium
(x∗1, x
∗
2, 0, 0) is the unique ESS if (20) holds.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. If u∗1u
∗
2 6= 0,
then from equations (16) and (17), we must have x∗1x
∗
2 > 0. Let g(u1, u2) =
√
er1σ2K2
u1K2(u2)
r2σ2K1
u2K1(u1)
, then
according to the equation (32), i.e.
r1x1u1σ
2
K2
K2(u2)
r2x2u2σ
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K1
K1(u1)
=
x2
ex1
⇔ x2 =
√
er1σ
2
K2
u1K2(u2)
r2σ
2
K1
u2K1(u1)
x1 = g(u1, u2)x1
which gives the following equality when it combines with the equation (14):
r1
(
1− x1
K1(u1)
)
=
a(u1, u2)
√
er1u1σ2K2
K2(u2)
r2u2σ2K1
K1(u1)
x1
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
=
a(u1, u2)g(u1, u2)x1
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
.
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Thus we have a unique solution x∗1 that is a function of traits ui, i = 1, 2:
x∗1 = f1(u1, u2) =
K1
2 − r1+aK1g2r1ah +
√
(r1+aK1g)
2+r1ahK1(r1ahK1+2r1−2K1g)
2r1ah
(33)
where g = g(u1, u2) =
√
er1σ2K2
u1K2(u2)
r2σ2K1
u2K1(u1)
. Similarly, Equation (32) combines with (15) gives the following
equality:
r2
(
1− x1g(u1, u2)
K2(u2)
)
= − ea(u1, u2)x1
1 + ha(u1, u2)x1
which also gives a unique solution x∗1 that is a function of traits ui, i = 1, 2:
x∗1 = f2(u1, u2) =
K2
2g +
aeK2
2r2ahg
− 12ah +
√
(r2g−aeK2)
2+r2ahK2(r2ahK2+2r2g+2eaK2)
2r1ah
. (34)
Therefore, we are able to solve for u∗1 and u
∗
2 by letting
f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = f2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) and
r1u
∗
1
σ2K1K1(u
∗
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=
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∗
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∗
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∗
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∗
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2 .
Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that the necessary condition for (u∗1, u
∗
2, x
∗
1, x
∗
2) being an
interior equilibrium of Model (13) is that the following equalities hold:
x∗1 = f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) =
x∗2
g(u∗1, u
∗
2)
= f2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) and
r1u
∗
1
σ2K1K1(u
∗
1)
=
(u∗1 − u∗2)g(u∗1, u∗2)a(u∗1, u∗2)
σ2a (1 + ha(u
∗
1, u
∗
2)f1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2))
2 .
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(a) The oscillations when σa = 0.15
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(b) The larger and faster oscillations when σa = 0.05
Figure 11: The population dynamics of the host and parasite for the co-evolutionary model (5) when σK1 = σK2 = K01 =
r1 = K02 = 1, r2 = 0.25 > d = 0.185, a0 = 5, e = 0.9, h = 4 with initial values (x1(0), x2(0), u1(0), u2(0)) = (0.5, 2, 1, 0.1),
while the value of σa is 0.15 (Figure 11(a)) and 0.05 (Figure 11(b)): the host x1 is red; and the parasite x2 is blue
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